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“Actual”	  Does	  Not	  Imply	  “Feasible”1	  
Nicholas	  Southwood	  (ANU)	  and	  David	  Wiens	  (UCSD)	  
	  
I.	  The	  Appeal	  to	  History	  
The	  familiar	  complaint	  that	  some	  ambitious	  proposal,	  while	  appealing	  in	  theory,	  is	  infeasible	  in	  
practice	   naturally	   invites	   the	   following	   retort:	   History	   abounds	   with	   instances	   of	   things	   that	  
seemed	   infeasible	   at	   the	   time,	   yet	   that	   have	   actually	   come	   to	   pass.	   Think	   of	   the	   abolition	   of	  
slavery,	  the	  enfranchisement	  of	  women,	  the	  election	  of	  a	  black	  president	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  
and	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court.	   Each	   of	   these	   things	  must	   have	   seemed	  
frankly	   fanciful	   prior	   to	   their	   realization.	   Yet,	   they	   were	   actually	   achieved.	   Presumably,	   then,	  
many	  of	  the	  ambitious	  proposals	  that	  seem	  infeasible	  in	  our	  own	  time	  may	  well	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  
perfectly	  feasible	  as	  well.	  Those	  who	  insist	  on	  the	  infeasibility	  of,	  say,	  eliminating	  global	  poverty,	  
reversing	  climate	  change	  and	  creating	  a	  world	   state	  have	   simply	   failed	   to	   learn	   the	   lessons	  of	  
history.	  
The	  Appeal	  to	  History,	  as	  we	  shall	  call	   it,	   is	  relatively	  pervasive.	  Thomas	  Pogge	  seems	  to	  
have	   it	   in	  mind	   in	   responding	   to	   the	   charge	   that	   fundamental	   transformation	  of	   international	  
trade	  practices	  is	  infeasible:	  
	  
Even	   a	   few	   thousand	   of	   us	   can2	  change	   the	   world	   forever.	   […]	   The	   people	   of	   Manchester	  
proved	  this	  in	  1787	  when	  they	  joined	  the	  uphill	  battle	  against	  slavery	  with	  a	  petition	  signed	  by	  
11,000	  of	  them.	  […]	  If	  they	  could	  recognize	  and	  stop	  their	  country's	  crime,	  then	  so	  can	  citizens	  
of	  a	  depressed	  steel	  town	  in	  today's	  United	  States	  (Pogge	  2005,	  p.	  81).3	  
	  
Holly	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  also	  seems	  to	  evoke	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	  in	  questioning	  the	  infeasibility	  of	  
effectively	  targeting	  factory	  farming,	  climate	  change,	  and	  nuclear	  proliferation:	  
	  
We	  only	  have	  to	  go	  back	  fifty	  years	  to	  find	  women	  conditioned	  into	  the	  domestic	  servitude	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Previous	  versions	  of	   this	  paper	  were	  presented	  at	   the	  Australian	  National	  University,	   the	  University	  of	  
California	   San	   Diego,	   the	   Association	   for	   Political	   Theory	   annual	   conference	   and	   the	   Australasian	  
Association	   of	   Philosophy	   conference.	   We	   are	   very	   grateful	   to	   many	   friends	   and	   colleagues	   for	   their	  
valuable	  feedback.	  We	  would	  particularly	  like	  to	  thank	  Christian	  Barry,	  Jesse	  Driscoll,	  Pablo	  Gilabert,	  Bob	  
Goodin,	  Benjamin	  Kiesewetter,	  Colleen	  Murphy,	  Seth	  Lazar	  and	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  this	  journal	  for	  
detailed	  written	  comments.	  Research	  for	  the	  paper	  was	  supported	  by	  DP120101507	  and	  DP140102468.	  
2	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  we	  shall	  assume	  that	  by	  “can”	  Pogge	  simply	  means	  “is	  feasible.”	  
3	  See	  also:	  Gilabert	  2012,	  p.	  241	  and	  Ypi	  2011,	  p.	  152;	  cf.	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men;	  and	  a	  few	  hundred	  years	  to	  find	  black	  people	  kept	  by	  white	  people	  as	  slaves.	  At	  either	  
of	   these	   historical	   junctures,	   someone	   might	   have	   asked:	   ‘is	   emancipation	   feasible?’	   ‘Is	  
gender	  equality	   feasible?’	  We	  know	   that	   the	  answer	   to	  both	  questions	   is	   ‘yes’,	  because	  we	  
have	   borne	   witness	   to	   the	   relevant	   social	   changes.	   Slavery	   has	   been	   abolished,	   and	   equal	  
rights	  for	  women	  have	  been	  won.	  In	  the	  present,	  we	  find	  we	  find	  industry	  engaged	  in	  factory	  
farming	   on	   a	  massive	   scale,	   resulting	   in	   the	   torture	   of	   a	   great	   number	   of	   animals;	  we	   find	  
many	  nations	  with	  nuclear	  weapons,	  resulting	   in	  the	  constant	  possibility	  of	  nuclear	  warfare;	  
we	  find	  sea	  levels	  rising	  rapidly	  due	  to	  climate	  change,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  low-­‐lying	  nations	  
are	   at	   threat	   of	   being	   completely	   submerged.	  We	  might	   ask:	   ‘is	   abolishing	   factory	   farming	  
feasible?’	   ‘Is	   universal	   nuclear	   disarmament	   feasible?’	   ‘Is	   a	   radical	   reduction	   in	   the	   global	  
concentration	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  feasible?	  We	  do	  not	  know	  the	  answers	  
to	  these	  questions,	  but	  we	  can	  make	  more	  or	  less	  educated	  guesses	  (Lawford-­‐Smith	  2013,	  p.	  
243).	  
	  
Nor	  is	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	  confined	  to	  the	  hidden	  crevices	  of	  the	  academy.	  Speaking	  at	  a	  G8	  
Meeting	   in	  London	   in	  April	  2013,	   the	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary,	  William	  Hague,	  had	   this	   to	  say	  
about	  the	  apparent	  infeasibility	  of	  eradicating	  sexual	  violence	  against	  women	  in	  war:	  
	  
Ending	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  Century	  slave	  trade	  was	  deemed	  impossible4	  and	  it	  was	  eradicated.	  
…	  Only	  two	  weeks	  ago	  we	  secured	  an	  international	  arms	  trade	  treaty,	  one	  that	  many	  people	  
thought	   could	   never	   be	   adopted.	   And	   today	   we	   know	   the	   facts	   about	   sexual	   violence	   in	  
conflict.	  [...]	  [W]e	  must	  not	  look	  away	  or	  rest	  until	  the	  world	  faces	  up	  to	  its	  responsibilities	  to	  
eradicate	  this	  violence.	  (quoted	  in	  Nolan	  2013)	  
	  
Here	  is	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  the	  gist	  of	  the	  argument	  underlying	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History:	  
	  
(1)	   Some	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  seemed	  obviously	  infeasible	  in	  the	  past,	  such	  as	  the	  eradication	  
of	  the	  slave	  trade,	  were	  actually	  realized.	  
(2)	   If	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  actually	  realized	  then	  its	  realization	  was	  feasible	  given	  circumstances	  
prior	  to	  its	  actual	  realization.	  
Therefore,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Again,	  we	   shall	   assume	   that	  by	   “possible”	  Hague	   simply	  means	   “feasible”	   (rather	   than,	   say,	   “logically,	  
metaphysically,	  or	  nomologically	  possible”).	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(3)	   The	   eradication	   of	   the	   slave	   trade	   was,	   in	   fact,	   feasible	   given	   circumstances	   prior	   to	   its	  
actual	  realization.	  
(4)	   If	  momentous	   historical	   changes	   such	   as	   the	   eradication	   of	   the	   slave	   trade	  were,	   in	   fact,	  
feasible	   given	   circumstances	   prior	   to	   their	   actual	   realization,	   then	   it	  may	  well	   be	   feasible	  
given	  our	  present	  circumstances	  that	  we	  (i)	  overhaul	  unfair	  international	  trade	  practices,	  (ii)	  
eradicate	   sexual	   violence	   against	  women	   in	  war,	   (iii)	   drastically	   reduce	   carbon	   omissions,	  
and	  so	  on.5	  
Therefore,	  
(5)	   It	   may	   well	   be	   feasible	   given	   our	   present	   circumstances	   that	   we	   (i)	   overhaul	   unfair	  
international	   trade	   practices,	   (ii)	   eradicate	   sexual	   violence	   against	   women	   in	   war,	   (iii)	  
drastically	  reduce	  carbon	  omissions,	  and	  so	  on.6	  
	  
This	   argument	   is	   appealing.	   Yet	  we	   shall	   argue	   that	   it	   fails	   at	   the	   point	  where	   it	   seems	  
most	  secure,	  namely	  premise	  (2).	  Premise	  (2)	  might	  seem	  trivially	  true	  or	  truistic.	  As	  Juha	  Räikkä	  
put	  it,	  “[w]e	  can	  never	  know	  what	  really	  was	  feasible	  in	  history,	  except	  in	  the	  trivial	  sense	  that	  
whatever	  actually	  happened	  must	  have	  fallen	  within	  the	  feasible	  set”	  (Räikkä	  1998,	  p.	  40,	  italics	  
added;	  see	  also	  Goodin	  1982,	  p.	  126).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  we	  shall	  argue	  that	  (2)	  is	  false:	  it	  does	  not	  
follow	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   was	   actually	   realized	   that	   it	   was	   feasible	   given	  
circumstances	  prior	  to	   its	  realization;	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  were	   infeasible	  given	  circumstances	  
prior	  to	  their	  realization	  are	  sometimes	  actually	  realized.	  “Actual”	  does	  not	  imply	  “feasible,”	  as	  
we	  shall	  put	   it.	  The	  fact	  that	  slavery	  was	  actually	  abolished	  does	  not	   imply	  that	   it	  was	  feasible	  
that	  slavery	  was	  abolished.	  The	  fact	  that	  women	  were	  actually	  granted	  the	  vote	  does	  not	  imply	  
that	   it	  was	   feasible	   that	  women	  were	   granted	   the	   vote.	  We	   are	   not	   saying	   that	   these	   things	  
weren’t	   feasible.	   The	  point	   is	   just	   that	   their	   being	   feasible	   does	  not	   follow	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  
they	  were	  actually	  realized.	  Nor	  are	  we	  saying	  that	  contemporary	  debates	  about	  the	  feasibility	  
of	  political	  proposals	  should	  avoid	  drawing	   insights	  from	  historical	  cases	  altogether.	  Rather,	  as	  
we	  shall	  see,	  our	  argument	  implies	  that	  the	  lessons	  appropriately	  drawn	  from	  history	  are	  more	  
sophisticated	  and	  nuanced	  than	  the	  purported	  insight	  of	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Stronger	  and	  weaker	  versions	  of	  (4)	  (and	  hence	  of	  (5))	  are	  also	  possible.	  For	  example,	  Pogge	  seems	  to	  be	  
saying	  not	  merely	  that	  it	  may	  be	  feasible	  but	  that	  it	  is	  feasible	  to	  overhaul	  unfair	  trade	  practices.	  But	  (4)	  
might	   also	   be	   weakened	   so	   that	   it	   merely	   amounts	   to	   the	   negative	   claim	   that	   a	   presumption	   of	  
infeasibility	  is	  defeated.	  Given	  that	  we	  will	  target	  premise	  (2),	  these	  complications	  do	  not	  matter	  for	  our	  
purposes.	  
6	  An	  anonymous	  referee	  has	  suggested	  an	  alternative	  rendering	  of	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History.	  We	  address	  this	  
alternative	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  the	  paper.	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Against	  (2),	  we	  advance	  what	  we	  shall	  call	  the	  Flukiness	  Objection.	  The	  argument	  is	  this:	  
	  
(6)	   The	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  feasible	  given	  circumstances	  C	  only	  if:	  given	  C,	  it	  is	  not	  
the	  case	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
(7)	   Some	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  are	  actually	  realized	  are	  such	  that,	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  
their	  actual	  realization,	  their	  realization	  was	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
Therefore,	  
(8)	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   if	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   was	   actually	   realized	   then	   its	   realization	   was	  
feasible	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  its	  actual	  realization.	  
	  
Claim	  (8)	  is	  just	  the	  negation	  of	  (2).	  	  
While	  something	  like	  the	  Flukiness	  Objection	  is	  sometimes	  hinted	  at	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
related	  literature	  on	  abilities	  (see	  e.g.	  Maier	  2014;	  Vihvelin	  2013,	  p.	  182;	  Estlund	  2011,	  pp.	  212-­‐
13),	   it	   has	   not	   been	   developed	   in	   any	   detail.	   Moreover,	   both	   premises	   are	   inadequately	  
motivated.	  Premise	  (6)	  typically	  rests	  on	  some	  controversial	  account	  of	  feasibility	  (or	  ability),	  or	  
on	   a	   questionable	   appeal	   to	   linguistic	   usage.	   Premise	   (7)	   is	   impossible	   to	   evaluate	  without	   a	  
better	   understanding	  of	   the	   relevant	   notion	  of	   counterfactual	   flukiness.	  We	  aim	   to	  develop	   a	  
novel	  articulation	  of	  the	  Flukiness	  Objection	  that	  is	  both	  more	  precise	  and	  better	  motivated.	  
The	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  Section	  II	  clarifies	  the	  key	  concepts.	  Sections	  III	  and	  IV	  
argue	   for	   the	   two	  premises	  of	   the	  Flukiness	  Objection,	  premise	   (6)	  and	  premise	   (7).	  Section	  V	  
discusses	  the	  upshot.	  
	  
II.	  Preliminaries	  
Our	  first	  task	  is	  to	  say	  something	  about	  two	  notions	  that	  will	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  what	  follows:	  
the	  notion	  of	  feasibility;	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  counterfactual	  flukiness.	  Let	  us	  consider	  each	  in	  turn.	  
	  
II.A.	  Feasibility	  
Premise	   (6)	   requires	  us	   to	  say	  something	  about	  what	   it	  means	   for	   the	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  
affairs	  to	  be	  “feasible”	  or	  “infeasible.”7	  One	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  present	  a	  positive	  account	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Two	   preliminary	   remarks	   about	   the	   notion	   of	   feasibility.	   First,	   we	   shall	   assume	   that	   the	   notion	   of	  
feasibility	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  “realization”	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  are	  
or	  could	  be	  realized	  by	  agents	  intentionally	  acting	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  states	  of	  affairs.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  
we	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  “realization”	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  by	  way	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  certain	  “natural	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feasibility	   from	  which	   (6)	   can	  be	  shown	  to	   follow.8	  This	   is	  a	   tall	  order,	  given	   that	  philosophers	  
diverge	  sharply	  over	  how	  to	  analyze	  the	  notion	  of	  feasibility.9	  We	  can	  hardly	  hope	  to	  resolve	  this	  
disagreement	   here.	   A	   second	   approach	   would	   be	   to	   argue	   for	   (6)	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   linguistic	  
intuitions	  and	  ordinary	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  “feasible.”10	  We	  are	  not	  especially	  optimistic	  about	  the	  
prospects	  for	  this	  approach.	  The	  linguistic	  case	  for	  (6)	  is	  hardly	  conclusive.11	  Our	  “feasibility”	  talk	  
is	   notoriously	   promiscuous.12	  And	   even	   if	   there	   is	   some	   folk	   notion	   of	   feasibility	   for	   which	  
ordinary	  usage	  is	  indeed	  a	  reliable	  guide,	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  this	  is	  the	  relevant	  notion,	  which	  
may	   instead	   be	   one	   that,	   despite	   its	   incongruence	   with	   ordinary	   usage,	   plays	   a	   significant	  
theoretical	  role.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
events,”	   such	  as	   the	   rising	  of	   the	  sun	   in	   the	  east.	  That’s	  because	   it	  makes	  no	  sense	   to	  ask	  whether	   the	  
rising	  of	  the	  sun	  in	  the	  east	  is	  “feasible”	  or	  “infeasible.”	  The	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  simply	  isn’t	  applicable	  to	  
the	  occurrence	  of	  such	  natural	  events.	  For	  further	  discussion,	  see	  below,	  section	  IV.	  Second,	  we	  are	  only	  
interested	   here	   in	   the	   binary	   sense	   of	   “feasible”	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   we	   may	   describe	   the	  
realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  as	  either	  “feasible”	  or	  “infeasible.”	  There	  is	  also,	  arguably,	  a	  scalar	  sense	  of	  
“feasible”	  that	  is	  being	  deployed,	  for	  example,	  when	  we	  describe	  the	  realization	  of	  one	  state	  of	  affairs	  as	  
“more	  feasible”	  than	  the	  realization	  of	  another	  state	  of	  affairs.	   (For	  discussion,	  see	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2013	  
and	  Gilabert	  and	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012.)	  While	  the	  scalar	  sense	  of	  “feasible”	   is	  potentially	   important,	   it	   is	  
clearly	  the	  binary	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  that	  is	  at	  play	  in	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History.	  
8	  This	   suggestion	   is	   sometimes	  made	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   related	   literature	   on	   abilities.	   For	   example,	  
David	  Estlund	  (2011)	  offers	  a	  version	  of	  the	  “conditional”	  analysis	  of	  ability	  according	  to	  which	  “A	  person	  
is	  able	  to	  (can)	  do	  something	  if	  and	  only	  if,	  were	  she	  to	  try	  and	  not	  give	  up,	  she	  would	  tend	  to	  succeed”	  
and	  then	  immediately	  notes	  that	  it	  follows	  straightforwardly	  from	  this	  analysis	  that	  “The	  mere	  fact	  that	  it	  
is	  possible	  that	  I	  do	  something	  doesn’t	  establish	  that	  I	  am	  able.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  I	  draw	  a	  jack	  of	  hearts	  
from	  a	  shuffled	  deck	  in	  a	  single	  draw,	  but	  I	  don’t	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  so.	  Actuality	  proves	  possibility,	  but	  
not	  ability”	  (Estlund	  2011,	  p.	  212).	  
9	  There	   is	   now	   a	   substantial	   literature	   addressing	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   understand	   the	   notion	   of	  
feasibility	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   notions	   such	   as	   probability,	   possibility,	   ability,	   volitional	   capacity,	  
demandingness	   and	   human	   nature.	   See	   e.g.	   Raikka	   1998;	   Brennan	   and	   Southwood	   2007;	   Southwood	  
2015b;	   2016;	   ms;	   Gilabert	   2011;	   2012;	   Gilabert	   and	   Lawford-­‐Smith	   2012;	   Lawford-­‐Smith	   2012;	   2013;	  
Estlund	  2011;	  Miller	  2013;	  Gheaus	  2013;	  Wiens	  2015;	  forthcoming.	  
10	  This	  suggestion	  is	  also	  sometimes	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  abilities.	  For	  example,	  John	  
Maier	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  “a	  sense	  in	  which	  fluky	  success	  …	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  ability”	  (Maier	  2014;	  see	  
also	  Vihvelin	  2014,	  p.	  182).	  
11	  Austin	   famously	   presented	   the	   case	   of	   a	   golfer	   who	   sinks	   a	   challenging	   putt	   and	   of	   whom	   it	   seems	  
correct	   to	   say	   that	   “it	   follows	  merely	   from	  the	  premise	   that	  he	  does	   it,	   that	  he	  has	   the	  ability	   to	  do	   it,	  
according	   to	   ordinary	   English”	   (Austin	   1956,	   218).	   Similarly,	   someone	   might	   argue	   that,	   a	   fortiori,	   “it	  
follows	  merely	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  he	  does	  it,	  that	  it	   is	  feasible	  that	  he	  does	  it,	  according	  to	  ordinary	  
English.”	  
12	  As	  is	  “ability”	  talk	  for	  that	  matter.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  frequent	  occurrence	  of	  the	  term	  “able”	  in	  ordinary	  
English	  occurs	  when	  we	  describe	  as	  things	  that	  we	  are	  “unable”	  to	  do	  things	  that	  we	  are	  simply	  reluctant	  
to	  do	  because	  they	  are	  somewhat	  inconvenient,	  thereby	  conveying	  our	  reluctance	  to	  our	  interlocutors	  in	  
a	   somewhat	   disguised	   and	   hence	   more	   palatable	   form.	   Yet	   it’s	   not	   clear	   that	   we	   are	   being	   exactly	  
insincere,	   since	   there	   is	   a	   sense	   in	  which	  we	   intend	   (and	   it	   is	   common	   knowledge	   that	  we	   intend)	   our	  
interlocutors	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  really	  going	  on.	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Here	   instead	   is	   the	   approach	   that	   we	   shall	   take.	   First,	   in	   lieu	   of	   a	   positive	   account	   of	  
feasibility,	  we	  shall	  present	  two	  necessary	  conditions	  on	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  feasibility.	  Many	  
accounts	  arguably	  satisfy	  these	  two	  conditions;	  we	  won’t	  take	  a	  stand	  here	  on	  the	  question	  of	  
which	  is	  the	  correct	  one.13	  Second,	  our	  approach	  is	  tailored	  to	  the	  particular	  dialectical	  context	  
within	  which	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	  is	  offered.	  Rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  defend	  the	  two	  necessary	  
conditions	   as	   independently	   plausible	   –	   say,	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   according	   well	   with	   linguistic	  
intuitions	  about	   the	  term	  “feasible”	  –	  we	  claim	  simply	   that	  our	   interlocutor,	   the	  proponent	  of	  
the	  Appeal	  to	  History,	  cannot	  coherently	  deny	  these	  conditions	  while	  also	  advancing	  the	  Appeal	  
to	  History.	  	  
The	  first	  condition	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  must	  be	  such	  that	  it	  is	  plausible	  
to	   attribute	   the	   belief	   that	   realizing	   certain	   states	   of	   affairs	   (say,	   abolishing	   slavery)	   was	  
infeasible	   to	  a	   substantial	  portion	  of	   the	  population	  at	   relevant	  points	   in	  history.	  Obviously,	   a	  
proponent	   of	   the	   Appeal	   to	   History	   cannot	   coherently	   deny	   this.	   To	   get	   off	   the	   ground,	   the	  
Appeal	  to	  History	  requires	  a	  stock	  of	  historical	  cases	  involving	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  were	  actually	  
realized	  despite	   their	   realization	  being	  generally	  believed	  to	  be	   infeasible	  at	   relevant	  points	   in	  
history.	  If	  the	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  is	  understood	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  not	  plausible	  to	  attribute	  
to	  a	  sizeable	  chunk	  of	  the	  population	  at	  the	  relevant	  point	  in	  time	  the	  belief	  that,	  say,	  abolishing	  
slavery	  was	   infeasible,	   then	   the	  proponent	  of	   the	  Appeal	   to	  History	   simply	  does	  not	  have	   the	  
requisite	  stock	  of	  historical	  cases	  to	  appeal	  to.	  
The	   second	   condition	   is	   that	   the	   relevant	   notion	   of	   feasibility	   must	   be	   fit	   to	   play	   a	  
potentially	  significant	  role	  in	  negating	  normative	  claims	  within	  the	  relevant	  class	  via	  some	  kind	  
of	   feasibility	   requirement.	   The	   so-­‐called	  “Ought”	   Implies	   “Feasible”	   (OF)	  proviso	   that	  we	  have	  
offered	  elsewhere	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  feasibility	  requirement	  we	  have	  in	  mind:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Among	  the	  accounts	  that	  satisfy	  the	  two	  conditions	  (at	  least	  given	  certain	  plausible	  further	  
assumptions)	  are:	  The	  Undue	  Costliness	  Account,	  which	  says	  that	  it	  is	  feasible	  for	  an	  agent	  A	  to	  realize	  a	  
state	  of	  affairs	  s	  given	  circumstances	  C	  iff:	  given	  C,	  A	  is	  able	  to	  realize	  s	  without	  undue	  cost	  (Räikkä	  1998,	  
pp.	  33-­‐38;	  cf.	  Gilabert	  2011,	  pp.	  59-­‐63;	  Miller	  2013,	  ch.	  1);	  the	  Conditional	  Account,	  which	  says	  that	  it	  is	  
feasible	  for	  an	  agent	  A	  to	  realize	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  s	  given	  circumstances	  C	  iff:	  given	  C,	  A	  has	  a	  “reasonable	  
probability	  of	  success	  [of	  realizing	  s]	  conditional	  on	  trying”	  to	  realize	  s	  (Brennan	  and	  Southwood	  2007,	  pp.	  
9-­‐10;	  see	  also	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012;	  Gilabert	  and	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012);	  and	  the	  Restricted	  Possibility	  
Account,	  which	  says	  that	  it	  is	  feasible	  for	  an	  agent	  A	  to	  realize	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  s	  given	  circumstances	  C	  
only	  if:	  given	  C,	  there	  is	  an	  attainable	  stock	  of	  all-­‐purpose	  resources	  that	  enables	  A	  to	  realize	  s	  (Wiens	  
2015).	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(OF)	   An	   agent	   A	   ought	   or	   has	   an	   obligation	   to	   realize	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   given	  
circumstances	   C	   only	   if	   it	   is	   feasible	   that	   A	   realizes	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   given	   C.	  
(Brennan	  and	  Southwood	  2007;	  Southwood	  ms).	  
	  
The	  relevant	  class	  of	  normative	  claims	  consists	  of	  the	  ambitious	  normative	  claims	  that	  tend	  to	  
elicit	  charges	  of	  infeasibility—those	  involving,	  say,	  the	  elimination	  of	  global	  poverty,	  the	  reversal	  
of	  climate	  change,	  and	  the	  creation	  a	  world	  state.	  A	  particular	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  is	  capable	  of	  
playing	  a	  potentially	  significant	  role	  in	  negating	  such	  ambitious	  normative	  claims	  just	  insofar	  as	  
(a)	   the	   feasibility	   requirement	   in	  which	   it	   is	   embedded	   is	   true	   (or	   valid);	   and	   (b)	   it	   is	   at	   least	  
sometimes	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  an	  open	  question,	  given	  what	  we	  know,	  whether	   the	  targeted	  
normative	  claims	  make	  infeasible	  demands.	  
This	  second	  condition	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  uncontroversial.	  It	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  dispute	  whether	  
normative	  political	  theories	  are	  subject	  to	  any	  feasibility	  requirement	  at	  all	  (Cohen	  2008),	  or	  at	  
least	  any	  feasibility	  requirement	  beyond	  some	  ultra-­‐minimal	  requirement	  that	  normative	  claims	  
not	  make	  demands	  that	  are	  impossible	  in	  some	  thin	  sense	  (Estlund	  2014;	  Gheaus	  2013);	  in	  the	  
latter	   case,	   it	  will	   rarely	  be	   an	  open	  question	  whether	   the	   relevant	   kinds	  of	   normative	   claims	  
make	  infeasible	  demands.14	  What	  matters	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  that	  denying	  the	  second	  condition	  
is	  not	  a	   coherent	  possibility	   for	  a	  proponent	  of	   the	  Appeal	   to	  History.	  Consider	   the	  dialectical	  
context	  within	  which	   the	  Appeal	   to	  History	   is	   advanced.	   Some	  ambitious	  normative	   claim	  has	  
been	  challenged	  on	  grounds	  of	  infeasibility.	  The	  Appeal	  to	  History	  is	  then	  offered	  as	  a	  way	  of	  (at	  
least	  partially)	  addressing	  the	  challenge:	  either	  by	  helping	  to	  establish	  that	  realizing	  the	  relevant	  
state	   of	   affairs	   is	   (probably)	   feasible,	   or	   by	   undermining	   a	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   realizing	   the	  
relevant	   state	   of	   affairs	   is	   infeasible.	   Of	   course,	   there	   are	   other	   ways	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  
challenge.	  One	  might	  reject	  the	  challenge	  as	   illegitimate:	  “I	  never	  said	  that	  radically	  reforming	  
unfair	  trade	  practices	  was	  feasible.	  I	  don’t	  know	  (or	  care)	  about	  that.	  I	  just	  said	  that	  this	  is	  what	  
we	   ought	   to	   do”	   (cf.	   Estlund	   2014).	   Such	   a	   response	   amounts,	   in	   effect,	   to	   denying	   that	  
normative	   prescriptions	   are	   subject	   to	   a	   relevant	   feasibility	   requirement.	   Alternatively,	   one	  
might	  dismiss	  the	  challenge	  as	  not	  warranting	  a	  response:	  “Don’t	  be	  silly.	  It’s	  obviously	  perfectly	  
feasible	   to	   achieve	   global	   democracy.”	   This	   amounts,	   in	   effect,	   to	   denying	   that	   it	   is	   an	   open	  
question,	   given	   what	   we	   know,	   whether	   the	   normative	   claims	   in	   question	   make	   infeasible	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Estlund	   (2011)	   concedes	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   argument	   a	   stronger	   version	   of	   the	   feasibility	   requirement	  
according	  to	  which	  “ought	  to	  X”	  implies	  “has	  the	  ability	  to	  X.”	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demands	   and	   hence	   that	   something	   like	   “Ought”	   Implies	   “Feasible”	   will	   have	   meaningful	  
normative	  application.	  But	   the	  proponent	  of	   the	  Appeal	   to	  History	  does	  not	   respond	   in	   these	  
ways.	   She	   seeks	   to	   address,	   not	   to	   reject	   or	   dismiss,	   the	   challenge.	   Such	   a	   response	   is	   only	  
intelligible	   insofar	   as	   she	   accepts	   that	   normative	   prescriptions	   are	   subject	   to	   a	   feasibility	  
requirement	   and	   that	   this	   requirement	   potentially	   negates	   the	   kinds	   of	   ambitious	   normative	  
claims	  that	  are	  at	  issue	  –	  and,	  hence,	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  sometimes	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  an	  open	  
question,	  given	  what	  we	  know,	  whether	  such	  claims	  make	  infeasible	  demands.	  	  
	  
II.B.	  Counterfactual	  flukiness	  
We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  counterfactual	  flukiness.	  Consider	  the	  following:	  
	   1. The	  Game	  of	  Darts:	  It’s	  a	  cold	  evening	  in	  July	  and	  a	  group	  of	  philosophers	  has	  taken	  over	  the	  
dartboard	  in	  the	  Dingo’s	  Jaws,	  their	  favorite	  pub.	  Each	  of	  the	  philosophers	  is	  a	  hopeless	  player,	  
totally	  uncoordinated,	  extremely	  shortsighted,	  and	  rather	  tipsy.	  2. Back-­‐of-­‐Bourke	  College:	  You	  are	  a	  Professor	  at	  Back-­‐of-­‐Bourke	  College.	  All	  of	  your	  current	  PhD	  
students	  are	  perceptibly	  mediocre,	  obnoxious	  and	  socially	  dysfunctional.	  Their	  written	  work	  is	  
palpably	  poor.	  Their	  teaching	  records	  are	  disastrous.	  And	  their	  references	  are	  ruinous.	  You	  tell	  
them	  that	  there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  any	  of	  them	  applying	  for	  permanent	  Philosophy	  jobs	  in	  the	  top	  
departments	  in	  the	  world.	  3. Impending	   Financial	   Doom:	   As	   a	   result	   of	   falling	   commodity	   prices	   and	   an	   unfavorable	  
exchange	   rate,	   Quokka	   Mining,	   a	   major	   mining	   company,	   is	   teetering	   on	   the	   precipice	   of	  
bankruptcy.	  To	  have	  any	  hopes	  of	  avoiding	  bankruptcy,	   the	  company	  needs	  $US10	  billion	  by	  
early	  next	  week.	  Having	  exhausted	  all	  other	  options,	  the	  CEO	  (facetiously?)	  suggests	  that	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  board	  buy	  a	  ticket	  in	  Saturday	  night’s	  Jackpot	  Lottery.	  
	  
Now	   consider	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   following	   states	   of	   affairs	   in	   light	   of	   the	   circumstances	  
described	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  scenarios:	  
	   i. The	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  involving	  one	  of	  the	  philosophers	  hitting	  the	  bulls-­‐eye	  
given	  the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  the	  Game	  of	  Darts.	  ii. The	   realization	   of	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   involving	   one	   of	   your	   current	   students	   getting	   a	  
permanent	  job	  in	  a	  top	  Philosophy	  department	  given	  the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  Back-­‐
of-­‐Bourke	  College.	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iii. The	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  involving	  Quokka	  Mining	  avoiding	  bankruptcy	  given	  the	  
circumstances	  described	  by	  Impending	  Financial	  Doom.	  
	  
Each	  of	  these	  states	  of	  affairs	   is	  such	  that,	  given	  the	  relevant	  circumstances,	  the	  realization	  of	  
the	   state	   of	   affairs	   is	   counterfactually	   fluky	   in	   the	   sense	  we	   have	   in	  mind.	   By	   this	   we	   simply	  
mean	  the	  following:	  given	  the	  relevant	  circumstances,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  fluke	  if	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  
were	  actually	  realized.	  
We	  propose	  the	  following:	  
	  
(CF)	   The	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky	  given	  circumstances	  C	  if	  
and	   only	   if:	   given	   C,	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   is	   sufficiently	   modally	  
fragile.15	  
	  
To	  say	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  sufficiently	  modally	  fragile	  given	  C	  is	  to	  say	  that	  
the	   state	   of	   affairs	   is	   not	   realized	   in	   a	   sufficiently	   high	   proportion	   of	   the	   worlds	   where	  
circumstances	  C	  obtain	  (see	  Lyon	  2011,	  sec.	  4;	  Southwood	  2015a,	  p.	  519,	  n.	  220).	  Consider	  the	  
state	   of	   affairs	   involving	   a	   philosopher	   hitting	   the	   bulls-­‐eye	   in	   view	   of	   the	   circumstances	  
described	   by	   the	  Game	  of	  Darts.	   This	  would	   surely	   be	   a	   fluke	   if	   it	  were	   actually	   realized.	  We	  
suggest	  that	  it	  would	  be	  a	  fluke	  just	  because	  no	  philosopher	  hits	  the	  bulls-­‐eye	  in	  a	  suitably	  high	  
proportion	  of	  the	  worlds	  in	  which	  the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  the	  Game	  of	  Darts	  obtain.	  	  Or	  
consider	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   in	   which	   one	   of	   your	   current	   students	   gets	   a	  
permanent	   job	   in	  a	   top	  Philosophy	  department	  given	   the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  Back-­‐of-­‐
Bourke	  College.	  This	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky	  because,	  given	  the	  specified	  circumstances,	  one	  of	  
your	  current	  students	  succeeds	  in	  landing	  a	  permanent	  job	  in	  a	  top	  Philosophy	  department	  in	  a	  
sufficiently	   low	  proportion	  of	  worlds	   at	  which	   the	   circumstances	  described	  by	  Back-­‐of-­‐Bourke	  
College	  obtain.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  One	  might	  wonder	  why	  we	  don’t	  give	  a	  probabilistic	  characterization	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  fluke.	  The	  quick	  
answer	   is	   that	   none	   of	   the	   standard	   interpretations	   of	   probability	   –	   the	   subjective	   or	   the	   objective	  
interpretations	  –	  will	  do.	  The	  standard	  subjective	   interpretations	  make	  the	  occurrence	  of	  flukes	  depend	  
on	  facts	  about	  agents’	  mental	  states.	  The	  standard	  objective	  interpretations	  have	  difficulty	  handling	  rare	  
events;	  and	  some	  flukes	  are	  surely	  rare	  events.	  Also,	  if	  determinism	  is	  true,	  the	  objective	  interpretations	  
imply	   that	   there	   are	   no	   flukes	   but	   only	   the	   appearance	   of	   flukes.	   Aidan	   Lyon’s	   (2011)	   notion	   of	  
“counterfactual	   probability”	   can	   facilitate	   a	   probabilistic	   characterization.	   Notice,	   though,	   that	   Lyon	  
presents	  counterfactual	  probability	  as	  measure	  of	  modal	   robustness,	  which	   is	   the	  dual	  of	  our	  notion	  of	  
modal	  fragility.	  
	   10	  
Several	   remarks	   about	   the	   notion	   of	   counterfactual	   flukiness	   are	   in	   order.	   First,	   it	   is	   a	  
counterfactual	  notion	  and,	  as	  such,	   importantly	  different	   from	  the	  notion	  of	   (actual)	   flukiness.	  
Obviously,	  the	  realization16	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  may	  be	  counterfactually	  fluky	  without	  being	  fluky	  
–	   if,	  say,	   the	  state	  of	  affairs	   is	  not	  actually	  realized,	  though	  not	  vice	  versa.	  The	  realization	  of	  a	  
state	  of	  affairs	  is	  (actually)	  fluky	   if	  and	  only	  if	  (i)	   it	   is	  counterfactually	  fluky	  and	  (ii)	   it	   is	  actually	  
realized.	  	  
Second,	   the	   notion	   of	   counterfactual	   flukiness	   is	   a	   circumstance-­‐relative	   notion.	   The	  
realization	   of	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   only	   counts	   as	   counterfactually	   fluky	   (or	   not)	   given	   certain	  
circumstances.	  So	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  involving	  a	  philosopher	  hitting	  the	  bulls-­‐
eye	  counts	  as	   counterfactually	   fluky	  given	   the	  circumstances	  described	  by	   the	  Game	  of	  Darts,	  
but	   it	  may	  not	   count	   as	   counterfactually	   fluky	   given	  other	   circumstances:	   say,	   those	   in	  which	  
one	   of	   the	   philosophers	   has	   20/20	   vision,	   has	   been	   drinking	  water	   all	   night,	   and	   has	   secretly	  
been	  receiving	  personalized	  training	  from	  Luis	  “the	  Flamethrower”	  Barberan.	  This	  circumstance-­‐
relativity	   helps	   to	   explain	   certain	   changes	   in	   counterfactual	   flukiness	   over	   time.	   For	   example,	  
suppose	   that,	   at	   some	   time	   prior	   to	   the	   situation	   depicted	   in	   Impending	   Financial	   Doom,	   the	  
Quokka	  Mining	  board	  members	  had	  several	  reasonable	  options	  for	  avoiding	  bankruptcy.	  Yet,	  for	  
whatever	  reason,	  bankruptcy	  was	  not	  avoided	  and	  Quokka	   is	  now	  on	  the	  brink.	  Plausibly,	  had	  
Quokka	  Mining	  actually	  avoided	  bankruptcy	  given	  those	  earlier	  circumstances,	  it	  would	  not	  have	  
been	  a	  fluke,	  whereas	  given	  their	  current	  circumstances,	  actually	  avoiding	  bankruptcy	  would	  be	  
a	  fluke.17	  
Third,	   the	   instantiation	   of	   counterfactual	   flukiness	   is	   compatible	   with	   a	   deterministic	  
world;	   the	   realization	   of	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   can	   be	   counterfactually	   (and	   indeed	   actually)	   fluky	  
even	   if	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	  was	   determined	   to	   occur	   by	   the	   relevant	   laws,	   given	   a	  maximally	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Notice	  here	  and	  throughout	  the	  paper	  that	  when	  we	  talk	  of	  the	  “realization”	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  –	  e.g.	  
the	   realization	   of	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   being	   “feasible”	   or	   “not	   “feasible”,	   “counterfactually	   fluky”	   or	   “not	  
counterfactually	  fluky”	  –	  this	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  realized	  at	  the	  actual	  
world.	  We	  are	  careful	  to	  specify	  “actual	  realization”	  when	  we	  mean	  to	  convey	  the	  latter.	  17	  In	   saying	   this,	   we	   stress	   that	   our	   objection	   does	   not	   license	   just	   any	   description	   of	   the	   relevant	  
circumstances.	   In	   determining	   whether	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   s	   that	   has	   been	   actually	   realized	   was	  
counterfactually	   fluky	   prior	   to	   its	   actual	   realization,	   we	   defer	   to	   historians’	   attempts	   to	   converge	   on	  
something	   like	   a	   “canonical”	   description	   of	   the	   relevant	   circumstances	   and	   ask	   whether	   the	   actual	  
realization	  of	  s	  was	  fluky	  relative	  to	  this	  canonical	  description	  at	  some	  salient	  time	  prior	  to	  its	  realization.	  
In	  determining	  whether	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  s’	  that	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  actually	  realized	  is	  a	  counterfactual	  fluke,	  we	  
defer	   to	   the	   relevant	   scientists’	   attempts	   to	   converge	  on	  a	   canonical	   description	  of	   status	  quo	  and	  ask	  
whether	  the	  actual	  realization	  of	  s’	  would	  be	  fluky	  given	  this	  canonical	  description.	  In	  short,	  our	  argument	  
requires	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  question	  qualifies	  as	  counterfactually	  fluky	  relative	  to	  
some	  salient	  description	  of	  the	  case,	  where	  “salience”	  is	  settled	  by	  the	  relevant	  sciences.	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detailed	  specification	  of	  the	  initial	  micro-­‐conditions.	  The	  key	  concept	  of	  modal	  fragility	  is	  meant	  
to	  indicate	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  variations	  in	  initial	  micro-­‐
conditions.	   If	   a	   specification	  of	   the	   relevant	   circumstances	   is	   consistent	  with	  wide	  variation	   in	  
initial	  micro-­‐conditions,	  and	  if	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  variation	  
in	   initial	   micro-­‐conditions,	   then	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   is	   modally	   fragile	   and,	  
hence,	   counterfactually	   fluky	   (cf.	   Lyon	  2011,	   sec.	   4).	   To	   illustrate,	   consider	   the	   state	  of	   affairs	  
where	   Quokka	   Mining	   avoids	   bankruptcy	   given	   the	   circumstances	   specified	   by	   Impending	  
Financial	  Doom.	  Suppose	   the	  actual	  world	   is	   such	   that,	   given	   the	   relevant	   laws	  and	   the	   initial	  
micro-­‐conditions	  at	  some	  time	  t0	  (e.g.,	  each	  relevant	  person’s	  neural	  states,	  the	  micro-­‐states	  of	  
the	   device	   that	   assigns	   lottery	   numbers,	   the	   micro-­‐states	   of	   the	   device	   that	   draws	   winning	  
lottery	  numbers,	  and	  so	  on),	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Quokka	  Mining	  board	   is	  determined	  to	  win	  the	  
Saturday	  Jackpot	  and	  use	  the	  money	  to	  save	  the	  company	  from	  bankruptcy.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  world	  
as	  described,	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  Quokka	  Mining	  will	  avoid	  bankruptcy.	  Nevertheless,	  realizing	  that	  
state	   of	   affairs	   is	   counterfactually	   (and	   actually)	   fluky	   because	   its	   realization	   is	   extremely	  
sensitive	   to	   variations	   in	   the	   relevant	   initial	   micro-­‐conditions.	   For	   most	   specifications	   of	   the	  
initial	  micro-­‐conditions	  –	  even	  those	  that	  are	  very	  slightly	  different	  –	  Quokka	  Mining	  would	  not	  
have	  avoided	  bankruptcy.	  Quokka	  Mining	  was	  “lucky”	   that	   the	  actual	  world	  was	  one	  at	  which	  
the	   initial	   micro-­‐conditions	   were	   just	   so;	   given	   the	   circumstances	   described	   by	   Impending	  
Financial	  Doom,	  it	  would	  have	  fallen	  into	  bankruptcy	  had	  the	  initial	  micro-­‐conditions	  turned	  out	  
(nearly)	  any	  other	  way.	  
Fourth,	  to	  say	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky	  relative	  to	  
some	  specification	  of	  the	  relevant	  circumstances	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  couldn’t	  
be	   realized	  without	   being	   a	   fluke	   given	   those	   circumstances.	   To	   illustrate	   the	   point,	   consider	  
again	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   in	   which	   a	   philosopher	   hits	   the	   bulls-­‐eye	   given	   the	   circumstances	  
specified	  by	  the	  Game	  of	  Darts.	  Realizing	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky	  given	  those	  
circumstances	   since	   a	   philosopher	   hits	   the	   bulls-­‐eye	   in	   a	   sufficiently	   low	   proportion	   of	   the	  
worlds	   at	  which	   the	   circumstances	   of	   the	  Game	  of	  Darts	   obtain.	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	   there	  
being	  some	  worlds	  at	  which	  the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  the	  Game	  of	  Darts	  obtain	  at	  which	  
hitting	  the	  bulls-­‐eye	  is	  not	  a	  fluke.	  For	  example,	  consider	  those	  worlds	  at	  which	  some	  prankster	  
creeps	  into	  the	  Dingo’s	  Jaws	  while	  no	  one	  is	  watching	  and	  replaces	  the	  darts	  with	  special	  darts	  
that	  are	  fitted	  with	  a	  special	  homing	  device	  such	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	  they	  are	  thrown,	  they	  hit	  
the	   bulls-­‐eye.	   That	   set	   of	  worlds	   is	   arguably	   consistent	  with	   our	   specification	   of	   the	  Game	  of	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Darts.	  So,	  while	  a	  paradigm	  case	  of	  counterfactual	  flukiness,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  the	  state	  of	  
affairs	  in	  which	  a	  philosopher	  hits	  the	  bulls-­‐eye	  could	  be	  realized	  in	  a	  non-­‐fluky	  way	  given	  (some	  
refinement	  of)	  the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  the	  Game	  of	  Darts.	  
Finally,	  in	  making	  judgments	  involving	  counterfactual	  flukiness	  we	  must	  be	  very	  careful	  to	  
specify	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  are	  at	  issue.	  Consider	  a	  modification	  to	  the	  scenario	  described	  
by	   Back-­‐of-­‐Bourke-­‐College	   in	   which	   all	   but	   one	   of	   your	   students	   are	   perceptibly	   mediocre,	  
obnoxious	   and	   socially	   dysfunctional.	   The	   exception	   is	   Brilliant	   Brunhilde,	   who	   is	   sufficiently	  
brilliant	   that	   it	  would	   not	   be	   a	   fluke	   if	   she	  were	   to	   get	   a	   permanent	   job	   in	   a	   top	   Philosophy	  
department.	   But	   suppose	   that	   another	   of	   your	   students,	   Abysmal	   Anton,	   actually	   gets	   a	   top	  
philosophy	  job.	  Is	  it	  counterfactually	  fluky	  that	  one	  of	  your	  students	  gets	  a	  permanent	  job	  at	  a	  
top	  philosophy	  department	   given	   the	   circumstances?	  Anton	   getting	   a	   permanent	   job	   in	   a	   top	  
Philosophy	  department	  is	  surely	  counterfactually	  fluky	  given	  the	  relevant	  circumstances	  since	  it	  
is	  highly	  modally	  fragile:	  by	  hypothesis,	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  Anton	  gets	  such	  a	  job	  is	  not	  
realized	  at	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  proportion	  of	   relevant	  worlds.	  By	  contrast,	   the	  state	  of	  affairs	   in	  
which	   one	   of	   your	   current	   students	   gets	   a	   permanent	   job	   in	   a	   top	   Philosophy	   department	  
needn’t	   be	   counterfactually	   fluky	   given	   the	   relevant	   circumstances,	   since	   it	   might	   not	   be	  
sufficiently	  modally	   fragile.	  Since	  Brunhilde	   is	  also	  one	  of	  your	  current	  students,	  and	  since	  she	  
lands	  a	  job	  at	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  proportion	  of	  the	  relevant	  worlds,	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  
one	  of	  your	  current	  students	  gets	  such	  a	  job	  might	  be	  realized	  at	  too	  many	  relevant	  worlds	  for	  it	  
to	  be	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
Having	   done	   something	   to	   clarify	   these	   key	   concepts,	   we	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   task	   of	  
defending	  each	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  Flukiness	  Objection.	  
	  
III.	  “Feasible”	  implies	  “not	  counterfactually	  fluky”	  
The	  first	  premise	  of	  the	  Flukiness	  Objection	  holds	  that	  
	  
(6)	   The	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  feasible	  given	  circumstances	  C	  only	  if:	  given	  C,	  it	  is	  not	  
the	  case	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
	  
Our	  argument	  for	  (6)	   is	  simple.	  There	  is	  no	  account	  of	  feasibility	  compatible	  with	  the	  denial	  of	  
(6)	  that	  is	  also	  compatible	  with	  the	  two	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  feasibility	  
that	  we	  enumerated	  above.	  These	  conditions	  are	  such	  that	  a	  proponent	  of	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	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cannot	  coherently	  deny	  them.	  Any	  account	  of	  feasibility	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  denial	  of	  (6)	  
violates	  either	  or	  both	  of	  these	  conditions	  and,	  hence,	  is	  not	  an	  account	  that	  a	  proponent	  of	  the	  
Appeal	  to	  History	  can	  coherently	  accept.	  
What	  might	  an	  account	  of	   feasibility	   that	   is	   compatible	  with	   the	  denial	  of	   (6)	   look	   like?	  
Such	  an	  account	  would	  have	  to	  identify	  some	  condition	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  sufficient	  for	  the	  
realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  to	  be	  feasible	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  
of	  affairs	  being	  counterfactually	  fluky,	   i.e.	  such	  that	   its	  realization	  is	  sufficiently	  modally	  fragile	  
to	  count	  as	  a	  fluke	  if	  it	  were	  to	  be	  actually	  realized.	  What	  kind	  of	  account	  of	  feasibility	  might	  fit	  
the	  bill?	  
The	  simplest	  option	  is	  to	  hold	  that	  feasibility	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  what	  is	  possible	  in	  some	  
ultra-­‐thin	   sense:	   say,	   what	   is	   logically,	   metaphysically,	   or	   nomologically	   possible.	   Clearly	   the	  
realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  could	  be	  logically,	  metaphysically,	  and	  nomologically	  possible	  and	  
yet	  sufficiently	  modally	  fragile	  to	  count	  as	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  This	  is	  true	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  
fictional	   examples	   that	  we	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	   section.	   Yet	   these	  are	  paradigm	  cases	  of	  
states	  of	  affairs	  whose	  realization	   is	  counterfactually	   fluky.	   If	   feasibility	   is	  ultra-­‐thin	  possibility,	  
then	  (6)	  is	  false.	  
To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  no	  one	  has	  explicitly	  defended	  this	  feasibility-­‐as-­‐ultra-­‐thin-­‐
possibility	   account.	   But	  Holly	   Lawford-­‐Smith	   (2013)	   comes	   close.	   According	   to	   Lawford-­‐Smith,	  
the	  realization	  of	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs	  is	  “feasible	  iff	  there	  exists	  an	  agent	  with	  an	  action	  in	  her	  (its)	  
option	  set	  that	  has	  a	  positive	  probability	  of	  bringing	   it	  about”;	  that	   is,	  “an	  action	  (A)	  such	  that	  
the	  probability	  of	  [actually	  realizing]	  the	  [state	  of	  affairs]	  given	  that	  action	  is	  greater	  than	  zero”	  
(Lawford-­‐Smith	   2013,	   pp.	   248,	   251).	   Moreover,	   Lawford-­‐Smith	   holds	   that	   “[a]n	   agent	   has	   an	  
action	   in	   her	   (its)	   option	   set	   iff	   her	   performing	   that	   action	   is	   not	   ruled	   out	   by	   any	   hard	  
constraint…	  Hard	  constraints	  include	  facts	  about	  what	  is	  logically,	  conceptually,	  metaphysically,	  
and	  nomologically	  impossible	  …”	  (Lawford-­‐Smith	  2013,	  p.	  252).	  So,	  according	  to	  Lawford-­‐Smith,	  
realizing	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   is	   feasible	   given	   circumstances	  C	   iff	   given	  C	   there	   exists	   a	   relevant	  
agent	   with	   an	   action	   such	   that	   (i)	   it	   is	   not	   logically,	   conceptually,	   metaphysically,	   or	  
nomologically	   impossible	   that	   the	   agent	   performs	   the	   action	   and	   (ii)	   the	   probability	   of	   the	  
agent’s	  realizing	  the	  state	  of	  affairs,	  given	  the	  action,	  is	  greater	  than	  zero.	  
Lawford-­‐Smith’s	   account	   also	   entails	   the	  denial	   of	   (6).	   For	   there	   are	  obviously	   states	  of	  
affairs	   of	   which	   it’s	   true	   that	   (a)	   there	   are	   relevant	   agents	   for	   whom	   it	   is	   not	   logically,	  
conceptually,	   metaphysically,	   or	   nomologically	   impossible	   that	   they	   perform	   certain	   actions,	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such	   that	   the	   probability	   of	   the	   agents’	   realizing	   the	   states	   of	   affairs,	   given	   those	   actions,	   is	  
greater	  than	  zero	  and	  yet	  (b)	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  This	  
is	   true	   of	   each	   of	   the	   three	   examples	   given	   in	   the	   previous	   section.	   Take	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	  
involving	  Quokka	  Mining	  avoiding	  bankruptcy	  given	  the	  circumstances	  described	  by	  Impending	  
Financial	  Doom.	  There	  is	  a	  relevant	  agent	  (any	  member	  of	  the	  board)	  for	  whom	  it	  is	  not	  logically,	  
conceptually,	  metaphysically,	   or	  nomologically	   impossible	   that	  he	  or	   she	  buys	  a	   lottery	   ticket.	  
And	   there	   is	   a	   non-­‐zero	  probability,	   given	   any	  member	  of	   the	  board’s	   buying	   a	   lottery	   ticket,	  
that	   he	   or	   she	   will	   win	   the	   lottery	   and	   hence	   that	   Quokka	  mining	   will	   avoid	   bankruptcy.	   So,	  
Lawford-­‐Smith’s	  account	  implies	  that	  Quokka	  Mining’s	  avoiding	  bankruptcy	  is	  feasible	  given	  the	  
circumstances	  described	  by	  Impending	  Financial	  Doom,	  even	  though,	  given	  these	  circumstances,	  
it	   would	   be	   sufficiently	   modally	   fragile	   to	   count	   as	   a	   fluke	   if	   Quokka	   Mining	   were	   to	   avoid	  
bankruptcy.	  Hence,	  on	  Lawford-­‐Smith’s	  account,	  (6)	  is	  false.	  
Here	   is	   the	  problem.	  An	   account	   of	   feasibility	   along	   these	   lines	   plainly	   violates	   the	   two	  
necessary	  conditions	  enumerated	  above;	  thus,	  however	  independently	  plausible	  or	  implausible,	  
it	   cannot	   be	   coherently	   accepted	   by	   a	   proponent	   of	   the	   Appeal	   to	   History.	   Take	   the	   first	  
condition.	  This	  holds	  that	  an	  account	  of	  feasibility	  must	  be	  such	  that	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  attribute	  to	  
a	   substantial	   portion	   of	   the	   population,	   at	   relevant	   points	   in	   history,	   the	   belief	   that	   realizing	  
certain	  states	  of	  affairs	  –	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery,	  the	  enfranchisement	  of	  women,	  or	  whatever	  –	  
was	  infeasible.	   If	  the	  feasibility-­‐as-­‐ultra-­‐thin-­‐possibility	  account	  is	  right,	  then	  people	  must	  have	  
believed	   that	   abolishing	   slavery	   and	   enfranchising	   women	   were	   logically,	   metaphysically,	   or	  
nomologically	   impossible.	   If	   Lawford-­‐Smith’s	  account	   is	   right,	   then	  people	  must	  have	  believed	  
that	   any	   action	   that	   had	   a	   positive	   probability	   of	   resulting	   in	   the	   abolition	   of	   slavery	   was	  
logically,	   conceptually,	  metaphysically,	   or	   nomologically	   impossible	   for	   the	   relevant	   agents	   to	  
perform.	  Both	   implications	  are	  absurd.	   It	   is	  manifestly	   implausible	   that	  people	   in	   the	  17th	  and	  
18th	  century	  generally	  believed	  that	  abolishing	  slavery	  and	  enfranchising	  women	  were	  infeasible	  
if	   “feasible”	  means	  what	   these	   accounts	   say	   it	  means.	   So	   these	   accounts	   of	   feasibility,	   while	  
compatible	  with	  the	  denial	  of	  (6),	  violate	  the	  first	  condition.	  
Or	  take	  the	  second	  condition.	  This	  holds	  that	  an	  account	  of	  feasibility	  must	  be	  such	  that	  
the	  notion	  of	  feasibility	   is	  capable	  of	  negating	  normative	  claims	  of	  the	  relevant	  ambitious	  kind	  
via	   a	   feasibility	   requirement	   (such	   as	   the	   principle	   that	   “Ought”	   Implies	   “Feasible”).	   Virtually	  
none	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  even	  the	  most	  ambitious	  political	  theorists	  advance	  
could	   turn	   out	   to	   make	   infeasible	   demands	   if	   these	   accounts	   of	   feasibility	   are	   correct.	   The	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resulting	   feasibility	   requirement,	   though	   valid,	   will	   lack	  meaningful	   normative	   application.	   So	  
these	  accounts	  will	  also	  violate	  the	  second	  condition.	  
Consider	   the	   sorts	   of	   social	   and	   political	   arrangements	   envisaged	   by	   the	   most	  
extravagant,	   pie-­‐in-­‐the-­‐sky	   forms	   of	   Marxism.	   It	   is	   clearly	   logically,	   metaphysically,	   and	  
nomologically	   possible	   that	   a	  Marxist	   utopia	   be	   realized	   in,	   say,	   Australia.	   Similarly,	   there	   are	  
clearly	   actions	   that	   are	   perfectly	   logically,	   metaphysically,	   and	   nomologically	   possible	   for	  
Australia’s	   Prime	   Minister	   Malcolm	   Turnbull	   to	   perform	   that	   would	   realize	   these	   kinds	   of	  
arrangements	  with	  non-­‐zero	  probability.	   So	   the	   feasibility-­‐as-­‐ultra-­‐thin-­‐possibility	   account	   and	  
Lawford-­‐Smith’s	   account	   imply	   that	   it	   is	   feasible	   that	   Australia	   realize	   a	  Marxist	   utopia.	   Thus,	  
they	   imply	   that	   we	   cannot,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   feasibility	   requirement	   like	   “Ought”	   Implies	  
“Feasible”,	  infer	  the	  negation	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  Malcolm	  Turnbull	  ought	  to	  turn	  Australia	  into	  a	  
Marxist	  utopia.	  
If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  clearly	  there	  is	  no	  point	  bothering	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  
of	   the	   kind	   that	   are	   actually	   a	   matter	   of	   controversy	   among	   political	   philosophers,	   such	   as	  
whether	   we	   ought	   to	   drastically	   reduce	   global	   poverty,	   or	   reverse	   climate	   change,	   or	  
whatever.18	  For	   these	   things	   will	   all	   count	   as	   straightforwardly	   feasible,	   and	   there	   will	   be	   no	  
prospect	  whatsoever	  of	  negating	  corresponding	  normative	  claims	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  something	  like	  
“Ought”	   Implies	   “Feasible.”19	  Thus,	   there	  would	   be	   no	   need	   to	   address	   the	   charge	   that	   some	  
ambitious	  normative	  claim	  makes	  infeasible	  demands	  by	  proffering	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	  or	   in	  
any	  other	  way.	  The	  charge	  can	  be	  straightforwardly	  dismissed.	  
In	  sum,	  we’ve	  shown	  that	  a	  proponent	  of	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	  cannot	  coherently	  accept	  
any	  account	  of	  feasibility	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  denial	  of	  (6)	  since	  any	  such	  account	  will	  fail	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  (2013)	  would	  presumably	  be	  happy	  to	  embrace	  this	  conclusion	  since	  her	  primary	  aim	  is	  
to	   argue	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   most	   of	   the	   interesting	   action	   for	   political	   philosophy	   concerns	   the	   scalar	  
notion	  of	  feasibility.	  However,	  if	  this	  is	  her	  view,	  then	  her	  position	  is	  dialectically	  problematic.	  The	  Appeal	  
to	   History	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   binary	   notion	   of	   feasibility,	   not	   the	   scalar	   notion.	   If	   Lawford-­‐Smith	  
accepts	  that	  the	  binary	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  is	  normatively	  unimportant	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  virtually	  any	  
normative	  claim	  will	  trivially	  satisfy	  it,	  she	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  charge	  that	  such	  and	  such	  a	  normative	  
claim	  makes	   infeasible	  demands,	  not	  by	   trying	   to	  address	   the	  charge	   (as	   she	  seems	   to	  do;	   see	  2013,	  p.	  
243),	  but	  by	  dismissing	  it.	  
19	  The	  only	  context	  in	  which	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  negate	  some	  putative	  normative	  claim	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
principle	  that	  “Ought”	  Implies	  “Feasible”	  is	  when	  the	  normative	  claim	  makes	  impossible	  demands.	  It’s	  not	  
the	   case	   that	   this	  will	   never	  happen.	   It	  might	  happen,	   for	  example,	  when	   the	  normative	   claim	   involves	  
certain	  sub	  claims	  that	  are	  internally	  inconsistent	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  can	  be	  brought	  out	  by	  an	  impossibility	  
theorem.	  But	  such	  cases	  are	  nonetheless	  extremely	  rare.	  We	  are	  grateful	  to	  Pablo	  Gilabert	  for	  discussion	  
of	  this	  point.	  
	   16	  
to	  satisfy	  two	  conditions	  on	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  feasibility	  that	  are	  presupposed	  by	  the	  Appeal	  
to	  History.	  
	  
IV.	  “Actual”	  does	  not	  imply	  “not	  counterfactually	  fluky”	  
Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  Flukiness	  Objection.	  This	  holds	  that	  
	  
(7)	   Some	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  are	  actually	  realized	  are	  such	  that,	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  
their	  actual	  realization,	  their	  realization	  was	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
	  
Our	  argument	  for	  (7)	  is	  simple.	  First,	  (7)	  is	  true	  if	  there	  is	  even	  a	  single	  real-­‐world	  example	  of	  a	  
state	  of	  affairs	   that	  was	  actually	   realized	  and	  yet	  whose	   realization	  was	  counterfactually	   fluky	  
given	   circumstances	   prior	   to	   its	   actual	   realization.	   Second,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   real-­‐world	  
examples	   of	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   were	   actually	   realized	   despite	   their	   realization	   being	  
counterfactually	  fluky	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  their	  actual	  realization.	  Therefore,	  (7)	  is	  true.	  
Here	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  candidate	  real-­‐world	  examples:	  
	  
1.	  On	   the	   night	   of	   24	  March	   1944,	   following	   a	   bomber	   raid	   on	  Berlin,	  DS664,	   an	  Avro	   Lancaster	  
heavy	  bomber	  in	  No.	  115	  Squadron	  of	  the	  British	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  caught	  fire	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  
struck	   by	   a	   Luftwaffe	   Ju	   88	   and	   began	   to	   spiral	   towards	   the	   ground.	   Flight	   Sergeant	   Nicholas	  
Alkemade	  was	  a	  rear	  gunner	  in	  DS664.	  Alkemade’s	  parachute	  had	  been	  damaged	  by	  the	  fire	  and	  
was	  unusable,	   so	  he	  chose	   to	   jump	   from	  the	  plane	  without	  a	  parachute.	  He	   fell	  approximately	  
18,000	  feet	  but	  survived	  thanks	  to	  his	  fall	  being	  cushioned	  by	  pine	  trees	  and	  snow	  on	  the	  ground.	  
His	  only	  injury	  was	  a	  sprained	  leg.	  
2.	   In	  November	  2002,	  Angelo	  and	  Maria	  Gallina,	  a	  husband	  and	  wife	   from	  California,	  bought	  two	  
separate	   tickets	   for	   different	   lottery	   competitions,	   the	   Fantasy	   Five	   and	   SuperLotto	   Plus.	   The	  
odds	  of	  winning	  the	  Fantasy	  Five	  were	  1	  in	  576,000	  and	  the	  odds	  of	  winning	  the	  SuperLotto	  Plus	  
were	  1	  in	  41.4	  million	  (the	  odds	  of	  winning	  both	  lotteries	  were	  1	  in	  24	  trillion).	  The	  two	  lotteries	  
were	  drawn	  on	  20	  November,	  2002.	  The	  Gallinas	  won	  both	  lotteries,	  in	  the	  process	  augmenting	  
their	  wealth	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  US$17,126,000.	  
	  
These	  examples	  establish	  the	  truth	  of	  (7)	  only	  insofar	  as	  the	  two	  following	  claims	  are	  true:	  
first,	  they	  are	  examples	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  were	  counterfactually	  fluky	  given	  circumstances	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prior	  to	  their	  actual	  realization;	  second,	  they	  are	  examples	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  were	  actually	  
realized	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  Let	  us	  take	  each	  of	  these	  claims	  in	  turn.	  
Are	   our	   cases	   examples	   of	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   were	   counterfactually	   fluky	   given	  
circumstances	  prior	  to	  their	  actual	  realization?	  Here	  are	  two	  objections.	  First,	  one	  might	  claim	  
that	  our	  cases	  do	  not	   involve	  the	  occurrence	  of	  genuine	   flukes	  but	  only	  apparent	   flukes.	  They	  
appear	   to	   us	   to	   involve	   flukes	   only	   because	   we	   lack	   full	   information.	   But	   if	   we	   had	   full	  
information,	  then	  we	  would	  see	  that	  they	  were	  not	  flukes	  at	  all.	  	  
This	   response	   seems	   to	   us	   to	   be	   intelligible	   only	   insofar	   as	   one	   accepts	   the	   claim	   that	  
there	  are	  no	  genuine	  flukes.	  But	  why	  accept	  this	  claim?	  The	  claim	  may	  seem	  plausible	  if	  we	  think	  
that	   (a)	   the	  notion	  of	  a	   fluke	   is	   to	  be	  understood	   in	  objective	  probabilistic	   terms	  –	  say,	  as	   the	  
realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  that	  has	  a	  sufficiently	  low	  physical	  chance	  of	  occurring20;	  (b)	  the	  
truth	   of	   determinism	   entails	   that	   all	   events	   have	   an	   objective	   probability	   of	   0	   or	   1;	   and	   (c)	  
determinism	   is	   true.	   But	   notice	   that	   we	   deny	   (a).	   (We	   need	   not	   deny	   (b)	   or	   (c).)	   We	   have	  
suggested	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   fluke	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   highly	  modally	   fragile	   event.	   It	  
seems	  clear	  that	  our	  examples	   involve	  the	  realization	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	   that	  were	  sufficiently	  
modally	  fragile,	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  their	  realization,	  to	  count	  as	  flukes.	  This	  can	  be	  so	  
even	  if,	  given	  the	  precise	  initial	  micro-­‐conditions	  and	  the	  relevant	  physical	  laws,	  the	  realization	  
of	   each	  of	   the	   states	   of	   affairs	   had	   an	  objective	  probability	   of	   1.	   The	  point	   in	   saying	   that	   our	  
examples	   involve	   flukes	   is	   to	   indicate	   that	   they	   involve	   states	   of	   affairs	   whose	   realization	   is	  
highly	  non-­‐robust	  to	  variation	  (within	  a	  certain	  salient	  range)	  of	  the	  relevant	  micro-­‐conditions.	  
This	   reply	   raises	  a	   second	  objection,	  namely,	   that	  our	  examples	   involve	   flukes	  under	  an	  
unduly	  narrow	  range	  of	  descriptions	  of	  the	  cases.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  verdict	  that	  our	  examples	  
involve	   flukes	   is	   unacceptably	   description-­‐sensitive.	   For	   example,	   given	   our	   reply	   in	   the	   last	  
paragraph,	  one	  might	  maintain	  that	  our	  examples	  involve	  apparent	  flukes	  as	  follows:	  if	  we	  could	  
specify	  the	  precise	  initial	  micro-­‐conditions	  for	  each	  case,	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  in	  question	  would	  
be	  realized	  at	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  proportion	  of	  worlds	  at	  which	  the	  relevant	  circumstances	  obtain	  
to	   qualify	   as	   non-­‐flukes.	   In	   reply,	   we	   concede	   that	   one	   could	   refine	   the	   specification	   of	   the	  
relevant	  circumstances	   in	  the	  suggested	  way	  and	  thereby	  challenge	  our	  claim	  that	  these	  cases	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Lyon	  (2011)	  characterizes	  his	  notion	  of	  counterfactual	  probability	  –	  which	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  our	  notion	  of	  
modal	  fragility	  –	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  objective	  probability.	  So,	  here,	  we	  are	  considering	  an	  analysis	  of	  flukiness	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  classical	  objective	  probabilities.	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involve	  flukes.21	  But	  this	  maneuver	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  giving	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  conveying	  a	  
valuable	  kind	  of	  explanatory	  information.	  	  
Flukiness	   judgments	   are	  meant	   to	   convey	  what	   Jackson	   and	   Pettit	   (1992)	   call	   “modally	  
comparative	   information”	  (cf.	  Lyon	  2011,	  pp.	  427-­‐429).	  According	  to	  our	  proposal,	   judging	  the	  
realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  s	  to	  be	  counterfactually	  fluky	  conveys	  information	  about	  how	  the	  
worlds	  at	  which	  s	  is	  realized	  compare	  with	  relevantly	  similar	  worlds	  at	  which	  s	  is	  not	  realized.	  In	  
particular,	   such	   judgments	   indicate	   that	   the	   realization	   of	   s	   is	   highly	   non-­‐robust	   to	   variation	  
(within	   a	   salient	   range)	   of	   the	   initial	  micro-­‐conditions.	   Such	  modally	   comparative	   information	  
serves	  a	  valuable	  explanatory	  purpose.	  In	  distinguishing	  flukes	  from	  non-­‐flukes,	  we	  convey	  that	  
the	  actual	  realization	  of	  some	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  highly	  dependent	  on	  certain	  micro-­‐conditions	  
being	   just	   so,	   while	   the	   realization	   of	   other	   states	   of	   affairs	   depended	   very	   little	   on	   the	  
specification	  of	   the	   relevant	  micro-­‐conditions.	   This	   is	   valuable	   information	   for	  explaining	   facts	  
about	   the	   actual	   world.	   The	   skeptical	  maneuver	   considered	   above	   foregoes	   the	   possibility	   of	  
conveying	  this	  explanatory	  information.	  	  
One	  might	  still	  try	  to	  maintain	  that	  our	  examples	  are	  unacceptably	  description-­‐sensitive	  
without	   incurring	   the	   foregoing	   cost.	   Take	   the	   case	   of	   Nicholas	   Alkemade.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	  
Alkemade’s	  parachute,	  while	  damaged,	  was	  not	  too	  damaged	  to	  use	  but	  that,	  not	  knowing	  this,	  
he	   chose	  nonetheless	  not	   to	  use	   it.	  Given	   these	  modified	   circumstances,	   his	   surviving	   the	   fall	  
from	  18000	  feet	  might	  not	  have	  been	  too	  modally	  fragile	  after	  all.	  Plausibly,	  Alkemade	  survives	  
the	   fall	   in	   a	   sufficiently	   high	   proportion	   of	   the	   worlds	   at	   which	   the	   modified	   circumstances	  
obtain	  –	  namely,	  at	  most	  of	  the	  worlds	  at	  which	  he	  deploys	  the	  damaged	  but	  usable	  parachute.	  	  
Modifying	  the	  circumstances	  in	  the	  suggested	  ways	  misses	  the	  point	  of	  our	  examples.	  In	  
fact,	  Alkemade	  survived	  his	  fall	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  parachute.	  In	  asserting	  that	  this	  involved	  a	  
fluke,	   we	   mean	   to	   convey	   the	   following	   information:	   that,	   even	   given	   the	   modified	  
circumstances,	  actually	  realizing	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  Alkemade	  survived	  a	  fall	  of	  18000	  
feet	  without	  a	  parachute	   required	   the	   relevant	  micro-­‐conditions	   to	  be	   just	   so.	  Notice	   that,	  on	  
our	  proposal,	  this	  information	  implies	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  states	  of	  affairs	  in	  our	  examples	  
was	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Although	   it’s	   unclear	   that	   non-­‐flukiness	   given	   this	   highly	   precise	   specification	   of	   the	   circumstances	  
signals	   great	   description-­‐sensitivity;	   there	   might	   remain	   a	   great	   many	   specifications	   of	   the	   relevant	  
circumstances	  such	  that	  our	  examples	  continue	  to	  involve	  fluky	  states	  of	  affairs.	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We	  might	  also	  handle	  the	  objection	  without	  refining	  the	  description	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  
at	   issue	  by	  holding	   the	   line	  on	  our	   specification	  of	   the	   relevant	   circumstances	   instead.	  To	  our	  
mind,	  asking	  whether	  Alkemade’s	  survival	  was	  fluky	  presupposes	  a	  certain	  salient	  specification	  
of	   the	   relevant	   circumstances.	   In	   particular,	   without	   any	   evidence	   that	   Alkemade	   had	   a	  
functioning	  parachute	  available,	  our	  inquiry	  implicitly	  presupposes	  a	  set	  of	  possible	  worlds	  that	  
excludes	   these	   possibilities.	   Put	   differently,	   our	   inquiry	   regarding	   the	   flukiness	   of	   Alkemade’s	  
survival	   presupposes	   that	  we	  are	   comparing	   the	   actual	  world	   to	   the	   set	  of	   possible	  worlds	   at	  
which	  Alkemade	  did	  not	  have	  a	  functioning	  parachute	  available.	  Of	  course,	  were	  we	  to	  find	  out	  
after	   the	   fact	   that	   Alkemade	   hid	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   deployed	   a	   functioning	   parachute,	   then	  we	  
would	  have	  to	  revise	  our	  specification	  of	  the	  relevant	  circumstances.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  revisions,	  
we	  might	  judge	  that	  the	  actual	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  not	  fluky.	  But	  we	  have	  no	  
reason	   to	   think	   that	   the	   states	   of	   affairs	   in	   our	   examples	   were	   actually	   realized	   under	   these	  
revised	  circumstances.	  Hence,	  we	  could	  resist	  the	  skeptic’s	  attempt	  to	  revise	  our	  specification	  of	  
the	  relevant	  circumstances	  as	  gratuitous	  –	  our	  consideration	  of	  the	  case	  implicitly	  presupposes	  
something	   like	   our	   specification	   of	   the	   relevant	   circumstances	   and	  we	   have	   no	   evidence	   that	  
might	  persuade	  us	   to	   revise	   the	  case	  as	  proposed.	   In	  view	  of	   the	   foregoing,	  we	  conclude	   that	  
our	   examples	   involve	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   were	   counterfactually	   fluky	   given	   the	   relevant	  
circumstances	  prior	  to	  their	  actual	  realization.	  
Next,	  are	  the	  examples	  that	  we	  have	  given	  examples	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  being	  actually	  
realized	   in	  the	  relevant	  sense?	  An	  affirmative	  answer	  might	  seem	  trivially	  true	  but,	   in	   fact,	   it’s	  
not.	   It	  might	  be	  objected	   that,	  while	  our	  examples	   involve	   states	  of	  affairs	  being	  “realized”	   in	  
some	   sense,	   they	   are	   not	   examples	   of	   states	   of	   affairs	   being	   “realized”	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   is	  
relevant	  for	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History.	  The	  relevant	  sense	  of	  “realization”	  is	  a	  feasibility-­‐applicable	  
sense.	  And	  the	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  is	  only	  applicable	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  states	  of	  affairs	  by	  way	  
of	   intentional	  action	  –	  that	   is,	  by	  way	  of	  agents	   intentionally	  acting	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  state	  of	  
affairs.22	  
We	  accept	  the	  point	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  states	  
of	  affairs	  by	  intentional	  action	  (see	  note	  7	  above).	  It’s	  clearly	  not	  applicable,	  for	  example,	  to	  the	  
realization	   of	   states	   of	   affairs	   in	   which	   no	   agent	   is	   playing	   a	   role	   in	   realizing	   those	   states	   of	  
affairs,	  such	  as	  the	  occurrence	  of	  natural	  events.	  Consider	  the	  striking	  example	  of	  Ann	  Hodges,	  
who,	   in	   late	   November	   1954	   in	   Sylacauga,	   Alabama,	   was	   hit	   on	   the	   thigh	   by	   a	   softball-­‐sized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  We	  are	  grateful	  to	  Bob	  Goodin	  for	  pressing	  this	  objection.	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meteorite	  while	  napping	  on	  her	  couch	  after	   it	  had	  crashed	  threw	  the	  ceiling	  of	  her	  home	  and	  
bounced	  off	   the	  radio.	  There	   is	  a	  sense	   in	  which	   the	  highly	   fluky	  state	  of	  affairs	   involving	  Ann	  
Hodges	   being	   hit	   by	   the	  meteorite	  was	   “realized”.	   But	   it	   is	   clearly	   not	   a	   feasibility-­‐applicable	  
sense	   of	   “realization.”	   To	   see	   this,	   notice	   that	   it	   would	   be	   highly	   infelicitous	   to	   describe	   Ann	  
Hodges	  being	  hit	  by	   the	  meteorite	  as	   “feasible”	  or	   “infeasible,”	  or	   indeed	   to	  ask	   the	  question	  
whether	  it	  was	  feasible	  or	  infeasible.	  The	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  simply	  doesn’t	  apply	  in	  such	  cases.	  
Nor	   does	   the	   notion	  of	   feasibility	   apply	   to	   the	   realization	   of	   states	   of	   affairs	   in	  which	  
agents	   contribute	   causally	   (perhaps	   even	   by	   their	   intentional	   action)	   but	   in	   a	   wholly	  
unintentional	  way	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  states	  of	  affairs.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  Randy	  Johnson,	  
who	  on	  24	  March	  2001	  was	  pitching	  during	  the	  seventh	  inning	  of	  a	  Major	  League	  Baseball	  spring	  
training	  game.	  During	  one	  particular	  pitch,	  a	  dove	  flew	  across	  the	  line	  (perpendicular	  to	  the	  line)	  
of	  the	  pitch	  and	  was	  struck	  dead	  by	  Johnson’s	  fastball.	  We	  might	  well	  say,	  not	  merely	  that	  the	  
state	   of	   affairs	   involving	   Randy	   Johnson	   hitting	   the	   dove	   was	   “realized,”	   but	   that	   Johnson	  
himself	   “realized”	   (or	   “helped	   to	   realize”)	   this	   state	   of	   affairs	   by	   performing	   the	   intentional	  
action	   of	   pitching	   the	   ball.	   Still,	   this	   doesn’t	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   feasibility-­‐applicable	   sense	   of	  
“realization.”	  For,	  again,	  it	  seems	  infelicitous	  to	  describe	  Johnson’s	  hitting	  the	  dove	  as	  “feasible”	  
or	  “infeasible,”	  or	  even	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  whether	  it	  was	  feasible	  or	  infeasible	  –	  Johnson	  had	  
no	  intentional	  state	  with	  respect	  to	  hitting	  the	  dove.	  The	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  seems	  inapplicable	  
to	  such	  cases.	  
One	  might	  argue,	  by	  analogy	  to	  the	  Hodges	  and	  Johnson	  cases,	  that	  our	  examples	  don’t	  
involve	   states	   of	   affairs	   being	   realized	   in	   the	   feasibility-­‐applicable	   sense.	   Here’s	   such	   an	  
argument.	   First,	   our	   examples	   involve	   states	   of	   affairs	   whose	   realization	   the	   relevant	   agents	  
knew	  to	  be	  counterfactually	  fluky	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  their	  actual	  realization.	  Second,	  it	  
is	  conceptually	  impossible	  for	  agents	  to	  intend	  to	  realize	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  
counterfactually	   fluky.	   So,	   third,	   our	   examples	   don’t	   involve	   agents	   intending	   to	   realize	   the	  
relevant	  states	  of	  affairs.	  But,	  fourth,	  feasibility	  is	  only	  applicable	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  states	  of	  
affairs	   by	   agents	   acting	   intentionally	   to	   realize	   them.	   So,	   finally,	   our	   examples	   don’t	   involve	  
states	  of	  affairs	  being	  realized	  in	  the	  feasibility-­‐applicable	  sense.	  
Is	  it	  really	  conceptually	  impossible	  to	  intend	  to	  realize	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  that	  we	  believe	  
to	   be	   counterfactually	   fluky?	   This	   seems	   rather	   questionable.	   It	   seems	  more	   natural	   to	   argue	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that	  there	  is	  a	  structural	  requirement	  of	  rationality23	  not	  to	  intend	  to	  realize	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  
we	  believe	   to	  be	   counterfactually	   fluky.	  On	   this	   alternative	   view,	   it	  would	  be	   irrational	   rather	  
than	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  intend	  to	  realize	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  we	  believe	  to	  be	  counterfactually	  
fluky.	  
But	  even	  if	  it	  is	  conceptually	  impossible	  rather	  than	  merely	  irrational	  to	  intend	  to	  realize	  
states	  of	  affairs	  that	  we	  believe	  to	  be	  counterfactually	  fluky,	  it	  simply	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  
agents	   in	   our	   examples	   not	   intending	   to	   realize	   the	   relevant	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   they	   don’t	  
intentionally	   act	   to	   realize	   those	   states	   of	   affairs.	   For	   the	   agents	   in	   our	   examples	   have	  
intentional	  attitudes	  of	  a	  kind	  that,	  even	  if	  they	  fall	  short	  of	  full-­‐blooded	  intentions,	  nonetheless	  
suffice	  for	  us	  to	  ascribe	  intentional	  action	  to	  them	  when	  they	  succeed.	  There	  is	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  
that	  they	  are	  attempting	  or	  trying	  to	  realize,	  something	  that	  they	  are	  aiming	  at,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  
under	  no	  illusions	  about	  just	  what	  a	  long-­‐shot	  it	  is.24	  Thus,	  Alkemade	  was	  making	  some	  kind	  of	  
attempt	  at	  survival	  when	  he	  jumped	  out	  of	  the	  plane,	  even	  if	  he	  wasn’t	  intending	  to	  survive.	  The	  
Gallinas	  were	  making	  some	  kind	  of	  attempt	  to	  enrich	  themselves	  when	  they	  bought	  the	  lottery	  
tickets,	  even	  if	  they	  weren’t	  intending	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  fact	  that	  in	  each	  case,	  and	  against	  the	  odds,	  
they	  succeeded	  means	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  say	  that	  they	  “intentionally	  acted”	  to	  realize	  the	  
relevant	   state	   of	   affairs	   and,	   hence,	   that	   they	   actually	   “realized”	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   in	   the	  
feasibility-­‐applicable	  sense.25	  
	  
V.	  The	  upshot	  
We	  have	  argued	  that	  “feasible”	  implies	  “not	  counterfactually	  fluky”	  and	  that	  “actual”	  does	  not	  
imply	  “not	  counterfactually	  fluky.”	  So,	  “actual”	  does	  not	  imply	  “feasible.”	  More	  precisely,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Familiar	   examples	   of	   structural	   requirements	   of	   rationality	   include:	   the	   Modus	   Ponens	   Requirement	  
(that	   one	   is	   required	   to	   believe	   that	   Q	   if	   one	   believes	   that	   P	   and	   one	   believes	   that	   if	   P	   then	   Q);	   the	  
Instrumental	  Requirement	  (that	  one	  is	  required	  to	  Y	  if	  one	  intends	  to	  X	  and	  believes	  that	  one	  can	  only	  X	  by	  
Y-­‐ing).	  For	  discussion	  of	  such	  structural	  requirements	  of	  rationality,	  see	  e.g.	  Broome	  2013;	  Kolodny	  2005;	  
Southwood	  2008.	  
24	  The	   idea	   that	   there	   are	   intentional	   states	   that	   fall	   short	   of	   intentions	   is	   a	   familiar	   one.	   For	   example,	  
there	  are	  what	  Hugh	  McCann	  calls	  “settled	  objectives”	  (McCann	  1991;	  see	  also	  Bratman	  2009).	  
25	  Notice,	   moreover,	   that	   this	   conclusion	   is	   further	   supported	   by	   the	   following	   linguistic	   data.	   In	   the	  
examples	  of	  Ann	  Hodges	  and	  Randy	  Johnson,	  it	  is	  clearly	  infelicitous	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  
relevant	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  feasible	  given	  the	  relevant	  circumstances.	  By	  contrast,	   in	  our	  examples,	  the	  
question,	  “Was	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  relevant	  state	  of	  affairs	  feasible	  given	  the	  relevant	  circumstances?”	  
does	  not	   seem	   infelicitous.	   The	  answer	   to	   the	  question,	  we	   take	   it,	   is	   that	   it	  was	  not	   feasible	   in	   either	  
case.	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(6)	   The	  realization	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  feasible	  given	  circumstances	  C	  only	  if:	  given	  C,	  it	  is	  not	  
the	  case	  that	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
(7)	   Some	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  are	  actually	  realized	  are	  such	  that,	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  
their	  actual	  realization,	  their	  realization	  was	  counterfactually	  fluky.	  
Therefore,	  
(8)	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   if	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   was	   actually	   realized	   then	   its	   realization	   was	  
feasible	  given	  circumstances	  prior	  to	  its	  actual	  realization.	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  upshot?	  
Most	   immediately,	   it	   turns	  out	  that	  an	  apparent	  truism	  is	   false.	  As	  we	  noted	  above,	  the	  
idea	  that	  “actual”	  implies	  “feasible”	  can	  appear	  truistic.	  To	  quote	  Juha	  Räikkä	  once	  again:	  “We	  
can	   never	   know	  what	   really	   was	   feasible	   in	   history,	   except	   in	   the	   trivial	   sense	   that	   whatever	  
actually	  happened	  must	  have	   fallen	  within	  the	   feasible	  set”	   (Räikkä	  1998,	  p.	  40:	   italics	  added).	  
Far	  from	  being	  trivially	  true,	  this	  claim	  is	  false.	  
Additionally,	  a	  relatively	  common	  and	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  reply	  to	  the	  feasibility	  skeptic	  
–	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	  –	  is	  unsound.	  Claim	  (8)	  is	  simply	  the	  negation	  of	  
	  
(2)	   If	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	   is	  actually	  realized	  then	  its	  realization	  was	  feasible	  given	  circumstances	  
prior	  to	  its	  actual	  realization.	  
	  
Since	   (2)	   is	   false,	   the	  Appeal	   to	  History	  contains	  a	   false	  premise	  and	   is	  unsound.	   It	   is	   simply	  a	  
mistake	  to	  answer	  the	  feasibility	  skeptic’s	  challenge	  with	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History.	  
Might	   there	   be	   some	   alternative	   rendering	   of	   the	   Appeal	   to	   History	   that	   escapes	   our	  
Flukiness	  Objection?	  One	  possibility	  is	  the	  following.26	  Suppose	  a	  pessimist	  argues	  that	  we	  have	  
no	  obligation	  to	  eradicate	  global	  poverty	  because	  achieving	  that	  goal	   is	   infeasible.	  An	  optimist	  
might	  reply	  as	  follows:	  “History	  is	  full	  of	  desirable	  moral	  goals	  that	  seemed	  infeasible,	  but	  many	  
of	   these	   were	   realized.	   The	   long-­‐run	   frequency	   with	   which	   apparently	   infeasible	  moral	   goals	  
have	   been	   achieved	   over	   the	   course	   of	   history	   gives	   us	   reason	   to	   be	   optimistic	   about	   the	  
prospects	  for	  eradicating	  global	  poverty.	  Without	  any	  further	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  prospects	  
for	  eradicating	  global	  poverty,	  we	  should	  think	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  its	  achievement	  is	  at	  least	  
high	  enough	  to	  justify	  investing	  resources	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  bring	  it	  about.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  We	  owe	  this	  suggestion	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee.	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This	  alternative	   rendering	  of	   the	  Appeal	   to	  History	  avoids	  our	  objection	  because	   it	  does	  
not	  rely	  on	  premise	  (2)	  above.	  But	  its	  reliance	  on	  long-­‐run	  frequencies	  creates	  other	  problems.	  
For	   example,	   how	   are	   we	   supposed	   to	   sort	   out	   the	   long-­‐run	   frequency	   of	   realizing	  morally	  
desirable	   goals	   that	   were	   thought	   to	   be	   infeasible	   prior	   to	   their	   realization	   (“MDG-­‐I”	   for	  
convenience)?	   The	   fact	   that	   a	   good	   number	   of	   MDG-­‐Is	   have	   been	   realized	   doesn’t	   yet	   say	  
anything	  about	   the	   frequency	  of	   their	   realization,	   for	  any	  claim	  regarding	   the	   frequency	  of	  an	  
event	  must	  specify	  a	  reference	  class.	  We	  might	  start	  with:	  Take	  the	  set	  of	  all	  MDG-­‐Is	  that	  have	  
been	   realized	   over	   the	   course	   of	   history;	   MDG-­‐Is	   that	   have	   been	   realized	   compose	   a	   large	  
proportion	  of	  this	  set.	  But	  this	   is	  uninformative	  because	  it	   is	  trivial.	   It	   is	  akin	  to	  saying	  that	  the	  
set	  of	  dogs	  that	  barked	  is	  largely	  (indeed,	  entirely)	  composed	  of	  dogs	  that	  barked.	  To	  make	  any	  
claims	  about	  the	  frequency	  of	  dogs	  barking,	  our	  analysis	  must	  also	  attend	  to	  the	  dogs	  that	  didn’t	  
bark.	   So	  perhaps	  we	   refine	  as	   follows:	  Take	   the	   set	  of	  all	  MDG-­‐Is;	   a	   large	  proportion	  of	   these	  
have	  been	  realized.	  This	   is	  better	  because	   the	   reference	  class	  now	   includes	  MDG-­‐Is	   that	  were	  
not	  realized.	  But	  how	  are	  we	  to	  enumerate	  the	  items	  in	  this	  reference	  class	  so	  as	  to	  make	  the	  
frequency	   claim	   intelligible?	   In	   particular,	   how	   could	  we	   possibly	   enumerate	   the	  MDG-­‐Is	   that	  
haven’t	  been	  realized,	  the	  “dogs	  that	  didn’t	  bark”	  so	  to	  speak?	  
One	  problem	  concerns	  individuation:	  How	  are	  we	  to	  identify	  particular	  attempts	  to	  realize	  
a	   MDG-­‐I	   (so	   that	   we	   can	   count,	   e.g.,	   every	   attempt	   to	   abolish	   slavery,	   some	   of	   which	   were	  
successful,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  not)?	  And	  how	  do	  we	  identify	  the	  relevant	  goals?	  Do	  we	  identify	  
as	  moral	  goals	  only	  those	  things	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  desirable	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  present	  
day	   values?	  Or	   do	  we	   also	   include	   those	   things	   that	   are	  now	   considered	  morally	   dubious	  but	  
would	   have	   been	   taken	   as	  moral	   goals	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   some	   earlier	   set	   of	   evaluative	  
criteria	   (e.g.,	   the	   subordination	   of	   women	   or	   racial	   minorities)?	   A	   second	   problem	   concerns	  
retrieval:	  Given	  that	  many	  unsuccessful	  attempts	  to	  realize	  an	  MDG-­‐I	  have	  been	  lost	  to	  history,	  
how	  are	  we	   to	   estimate	   the	  number	  of	   unrealized	  MDG-­‐Is	   (which	   is	   required	   to	   estimate	   the	  
frequency	  of	   realized	  MDG-­‐Is)?	  Without	  a	  principled	  way	   to	  give	   compelling	  answers	   to	   these	  
questions	   (we	   can’t	   see	   any	   options),	   this	   alternative	   Appeal	   to	   History	   seems	   doomed	   to	  
unintelligibility.	  
Lest	   we	   be	  misunderstood,	   let	   us	   stress	   that	   in	   rejecting	   the	   Appeal	   to	   History	  we	   are	  
certainly	  not	  denying	  that	  we	  can	   learn	   important	   lessons	   from	  history	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  
realizing	  ambitious	  normative	  proposals	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now.	  Nor	  do	  we	  deny,	  more	  specifically,	  
that	  the	  kinds	  of	  historical	  cases	  to	  which	  proponents	  of	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History	  appeal,	  such	  as	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the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  and	  the	  enfranchisement	  of	  women,	  are	  potentially	  instructive	  for	  both	  
proponents	   and	   opponents	   of	   radical	   change.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   these	   cases	   are	   potentially	  
instructive	   in	   virtue	   of	   what	   we	   can	   learn	   from	   analyzing	   the	   particular	   causal	   processes	   by	  
which	   they	   were	   realized,	   not	   because	   they	   involved	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   were	   actually	  
realized.27	  Particularly	  important	  perhaps	  were	  the	  substantial	  cultural	  changes	  –	  brought	  about	  
by	  sustained	  and	  concerted	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  certain	  actors	  –	  which	  took	  the	  realization	  of	  
the	   relevant	   states	   of	   affairs	   from	   unachievable	   pipedreams	   to	   being	   within	   reach.	  
Understanding	   the	   complex	   dynamics	   of	   the	   processes	   that	   were	   operative	   within	   these	  
dramatic	   transformations	   evidently	   requires	   intricate	   and	   in-­‐depth	   historical	   analysis.	   Hence,	  
appropriate	   appeals	   to	   history	  must	   undertake	   at	   least	   the	   following	   kinds	   of	   analyses:	   (1)	   a	  
specification	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  relevant	  state	  of	  
affairs,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conditions	  that	  were	  conducive	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  these	  mechanisms;	  (2)	  
a	   specification	  of	   the	   causal	  mechanisms	   that	   could	   realize	   some	  proposed	   state	  of	   affairs,	   as	  
well	  as	  the	  conditions	  that	  must	  obtain	  for	  these	  mechanisms	  to	  operate	  as	  expected;	  and	  (3)	  a	  
comparison	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  conditions	  that	  obtained	  in	  the	  historical	  case	  with	  the	  set	  
of	   mechanisms	   and	   conditions	   that	   could	   realize	   the	   proposed	   state	   of	   affairs	   in	   the	  
contemporary	  setting	  (cf.	  Wiens	  2013).	  This	  is	  much	  more	  involved	  than	  the	  quick-­‐and-­‐dirty	  sort	  
of	  historical	  appeal	  that	  figures	  in	  the	  Appeal	  to	  History.28	  
Finally,	   our	   argument	   against	   the	   idea	   that	   “actual”	   implies	   “feasible”	   has	   some	  
interesting	   normative	   implications.	   Most	   obviously,	   certain	   normative	   inferences	   that	   the	  
Appeal	  to	  History	  is	  meant	  to	  block	  are	  unblocked.	  Suppose	  that	  someone	  argues,	  via	  the	  Appeal	  
to	   History,	   that	   realizing	   some	   highly	   desirable	   state	   of	   affairs	   (say,	   overhauling	   unfair	   trade	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  pertinent	  discussion	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  
practice,	  see	  Beitz	  2009;	  for	  a	  critique	  see	  Barry	  and	  Southwood	  2011.	  
28	  Perhaps	  proponents	  use	  the	  simplistic	  Appeal	  to	  History	  as	  shorthand	  for	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  kind	  of	  
analysis	   we	   sketch	   here.	   This	  may	   be	   so,	   but	   it	   doesn’t	   avoid	   our	   objection.	   Notice	   that	   the	   simplistic	  
Appeal	   to	   History	   can	   be	   construed	   as	   arguing	   by	   analogy	   as	   follows:	   (a)	   Consider	   a	   historical	   state	   of	  
affairs,	   s,	   that	   represents	   radical	   social	   change.	   (b)	   We	   know	   s	   was	   feasible	   because	   it	   was	   actually	  
realized.	  (c)	  The	  proposed	  state	  of	  affairs,	  s’,	  is	  relevantly	  similar	  to	  s.	  (d)	  Therefore,	  by	  analogy,	  we	  cannot	  
rule	  out	  the	  realization	  of	  s’	  on	  feasibility	  grounds.	  Our	  objection	  undermines	  (b).	  But,	  as	  suggested,	  (b)	  
might	  be	  shorthand	  for	  (b’):	  We	  know	  s	  was	  feasible	  in	  light	  of	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  conditions	  in	  
place	  at	  the	  time	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  s	  was	  realized.	  Given	  this,	  we	  should	  read	  (c)	  as	  (c’):	  The	  
conditions	  that	  obtain	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  operative	  at	  the	  actual	  world	  here	  and	  now	  are	  relevantly	  
similar	  to	  those	  that	  we	  find	  in	  the	  historical	  case	  and	  s’	  can	  be	  realized	  by	  these	  mechanisms	  given	  these	  
conditions.	   From	   (b’)	   and	   (c’),	   we	   can	   infer	   something	   like	   (d).	   We	   have	   no	   problem	   with	   the	   more	  
sophisticated	  argument.	  Our	  objection	  denies	   that	   (b)	  presents	   an	  appropriate	   shorthand	   for	   (b’)	   –	   the	  
fact	  that	  some	  historical	  state	  of	  affairs	  was	  actually	  realized	  is	  simply	  irrelevant	  for	  assessing	  whether	  its	  
actual	  realization	  was	  feasible.	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practices)	   is	   feasible.	   If	   true,	   this	  would	   suffice	   to	  block	   any	  ought-­‐negating	   inference	  derived	  
from	  something	  like	  an	  “Ought”	  Implies	  “Feasible”	  principle:	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  we	  ought	  
to	  overhaul	   unfair	   trade	  practices.	   Since	   the	  Appeal	   to	  History	   is	   unsound,	   it	   follows	   that	   any	  
such	  ought-­‐negating	  inference	  is	  unblocked.	  
Our	  argument	  is	  also	  potentially	  normatively	  significant	  in	  a	  more	  direct	  way,	  namely,	  by	  
circumscribing	  the	  normative	  claims	  that	  are	  applicable	  to	  us	  in	  light	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  “feasible”	  
implies	   “not	   counterfactually	   fluky.”	   To	   negate	   a	   normative	   claim	   via	   something	   like	   “Ought”	  
Implies	  “Feasible,”	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  the	  target	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  counterfactually	  fluky	  
given	  present	  circumstances.	  
This	   raises	   a	   concern	   that	   our	   argument	   against	   the	   Appeal	   to	   History	   will	   have	  
objectionably	   conservative	   implications	   for	   normative	   political	   theory.	   Consider	   an	   ambitious	  
egalitarian	  policy	   that	   involves	   realizing	  some	  radically	  egalitarian	  state	  of	  affairs,	   such	   that	   (i)	  
the	  benefits	  would	  be	  colossal,	  were	  it	  to	  be	  realized,	  (ii)	  the	  costs	  of	  trying	  and	  failing	  would	  be	  
not	  much	  greater	   than	   the	  costs	  of	  not	   trying,	  and	   (iii)	   its	   realization	   is	   counterfactually	   fluky.	  
Under	  these	  circumstances,	  it	  might	  seem	  obvious	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  pursue	  the	  policy.	  But	  the	  
claim	  that	  “feasible”	  implies	  “not	  counterfactually	  fluky”	  that	  we	  used	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  claim	  
that	   “actual”	   implies	   “feasible”	   implies	   that	   it	   is	   infeasible	   to	   realize	   the	   proposed	   radical	  
egalitarianism.	   Thus,	   given	   a	   feasibility	   requirement	   like	   “Ought”	   Implies	   “Feasible,”	   it	   follows	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  realize	  the	  proposed	  radically	  egalitarian	  state	  of	  affairs.	  
One	   possible	   response	   is	   to	   deny	   that	   normative	   political	   theories	   are	   subject	   to	   a	  
feasibility	   requirement.	   Perhaps	   these	   cases	   show	   that	   there	   are	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   are	  
counterfactually	  fluky,	  and	  hence	  infeasible,	  but	  that	  we	  nonetheless	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  bring	  
about	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Estlund	  2014,	  Gheaus	  2013).	  But	  we	  needn’t	  go	  down	  this	  path.	  We	  can	  capture	  
the	   idea	   animating	   the	   conservatism	   worry	   without	   giving	   up	   any	   feasibility	   requirement	   by	  
drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  (i)	  desirable	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  we	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  realize	  
and	  (ii)	  desirable	  states	  of	  affairs	  that	  we	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  try	  to	  realize.	  
Recall	   the	   case	   of	   Flight	   Sergeant	   Alkemade.	   The	   state	   of	   affairs	   in	   which	   Alkemade	  
survived	  was	  clearly	  counterfactually	  fluky	  and	  thus,	  by	  (6),	  infeasible.	  A	  feasibility	  requirement	  
like	  “Ought”	   Implies	  “Feasible”	   implies	   it	  was	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Alkemade	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  
survive.	  Intuitively,	  this	  is	  the	  right	  result.	  But	  notice	  that	  saying	  this	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  
saying	   that	   Alkemade	   had	   an	   obligation	   to	   try	   to	   survive	   by,	   say,	   jumping	   out	   of	   the	   plane	  
without	   the	  parachute.	  After	  all,	   the	  benefits	  of	   surviving	  were	  presumably	  great	  enough	   (not	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only	   for	  himself	  but	  also	   for	  his	   loving	   family	  and	   friends)	  and	  the	  costs	  of	   jumping	  out	  of	   the	  
plane	   and	   dying	   presumably	   not	  much	   greater	   than	   the	   costs	   of	   staying	   in	   the	   plane	   until	   it	  
spiraled	  uncontrollably	   into	  the	  earth	  and	  exploded.	  It	   is	  at	   least	  arguable	  that	  his	  nearest	  and	  
dearest	  would	  have	  had	  a	  legitimate	  complaint	  against	  him	  if	  he	  hadn’t	  tried,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  
preposterous	  to	  suppose	  that	  they	  would	  have	  had	  a	  legitimate	  complaint	  against	  him	  if	  he	  had	  
tried	  and	  failed.	  
It	   seems	   to	   us	   that	   we	   should	   say	   the	   same	   thing	   about	   the	   ambitious	   egalitarian	  
proposal.	   It	   is	  at	   least	  arguable	  that	   if	   (i)	   the	  benefits	  of	  realizing	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  are	  great	  
enough	  and	  (ii)	  the	  costs	  of	  trying	  and	  failing	  are	  not	  going	  to	  be	  much	  greater	  than	  not	  trying,	  
then	  we	  ought	  to	  try	  to	  realize	  the	  egalitarian	  state	  of	  affairs.	  This	  can	  be	  so	  even	  though	  it’s	  not	  
true	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  realize	  the	  egalitarian	  state	  of	  affairs.	  This,	  of	  course,	  raises	  an	  interesting	  
and	   important	   question	   that	   has	   received	   relatively	   little	   attention:	   namely,	   what	   are	   the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  we	  have	  obligations	   to	   try	   to	  realize	  a	  desirable	  state	  of	  affairs	   that	   is	  
infeasible?	  Alas,	  we	  must	  leave	  this	  issue	  for	  another	  time.29	  
It	   is	   time	   to	   conclude.	   We	   have	   argued	   that	   “actual”	   does	   not	   imply	   “feasible.”	   This	  
conclusion	  is	  of	  interest	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  And	  it	  potentially	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  normative	  issues	  in	  political	  philosophy,	  at	   least	  on	  the	  (widespread)	  assumption	  that	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